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Policy Levers Tailoring Patent Law to
Biotechnology: Comparing U.S. and
European Approaches
Geertrui Van Overwalle*
In their animated book The Patent Crisis and How the
Courts Can Solve It, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley give an account of
their quest into the judicial treatment of patents in different industry
sectors. They present an in-depth commentary on industry-specific
differences in the patent system from both a legal and economic perspective.
The present article attempts to enrich the conversation by sketching the
situation in Europe and providing an interesting measure for comparison.
In doing so, the paper mainly focuses on the legal situation, and does not
enter into the economics discussion.
The paper concludes that current European patent law holds
substantial potential for technology-specific application. Even though the
European Patent Convention (EPC) may have been conceived at its
inception as a nominally neutral patent statute, our study clearly reveals
that substantial discretion to differentiate the patent system by industry,
and in particular to tailor it to the specificities of the biotechnology sector,
has been built into the system over the years. Although the EPC was
introduced as a unitary regulatory tool, intended to operate the same way
across technologies, European Patent Office (EPO) case law has shown
increased interest and ability in tailoring patent law to the needs of distinct
technology sectors, and in particular the biotechnology sector.
Given the civil law tradition in which European patent law operates,
a prevalence of well-articulated macro rules openly set forth by the
legislature was anticipated. However, a clear predominance of
jurisprudential micro policy levers has emerged.
* Professor of IP Law at the University of Leuven (Belgium), Professor of Patent Law and New
Technologies at Tilburg University (the Netherlands). The research for the present paper was
concluded in April 2010. Any developments since have not been taken into consideration
systematically. The author wishes to express her gratitude to Stefan Bechtold and Liesbet Paemen for
their constructive comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. The author also gratefully
acknowledges the support of the Vancraesbeeck Fund.
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Not all European policy levers uncovered in the present study work
to the advantage of the biotechnology industry. Closer analysis of the
various policy levers reveals that rather than systematically expanding the
patent system to accommodate biotechnology inventions and stimulating
innovation in the biotechnology sector, some policy levers narrow down the
patent potential for biotechnological inventions, in an attempt to respond to
concerns of public health and ethical conscience.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. “The Patent Crisis”
In their book The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It,1 Burk and
Lemley start from the observation that today’s technology world is characterized
by differing innovation and patent patterns among sectors. Innovation is not all of
a piece, and innovation patterns and research-and-development expenditures may
differ from industry to industry in a variety of ways.2 Those differences extend to
the way in which industry players experience the patent system and result in patent
patterns which may vary from industry to industry as well. Firms’ propensity to
obtain patents differs across sectors3 and some industries rely more heavily on
patents than others. Patent prosecution processes diverge according to industry
and getting a patent is quicker, cheaper, and easier in some industries than in
others.4 Distribution of value itself varies systematically by industry.5 Even the
effective scope of granted patents is different by industry, and there is not always a
one-to-one correspondence between a single patent and a single product.6 And the
construction of a patent portfolio is also industry specific.7

1. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT (2009).
2. Id. at 5, 38, 39–41 (“The evidence is overwhelming that different industries have different
needs and experience the patent system differently.”). Even though “we have one set of legal rules . . .
the industries affected by those rules operate in very different patent systems.” Id. at 65.
3. Id. at 49, 178 (with reference to Erik Brouwer & Alfred Kleinknecht, Innovative Output and a
Firm’s Propensity to Patent: An Exploration of CIS Micro Data, 28 RES. POL. 615 (1999); OTTO J.
BACHMANN ET AL., PATENTS AND THE CORPORATION 195 (2d ed. 1959); F.M. Scherer et al., Patents
and the Corporation, Harvard Bus. Sch. 195 (1959).
4. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 41 (citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s
Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2114 (2000)).
5. Id. at 52 (with reference to Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by
Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 79 (1998)).
6. Id. at 53.
7. Id. at 54 (citing Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (2005)).
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Focusing on the pharmaceutical industry, Burk and Lemley set forth that the
pharmaceutical industry is characterized by noncumulative innovation, where the
need for further research on a particular drug after FDA approval is not high.8 As
to patent protection, there seems to be a strong consensus that patent strategies
are well established in the pharma industry, that this sector heavily relies on patent
protection, and that it is one of the key users of the patent system.9 In the
biotechnology sector, patent protection is quite often also seen as critical to
innovation,10 even though concerns have arisen about the many upstream patents
that might hamper the development of final drugs and therapies.11 As to patent
prosecution, chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnological patents seem to
spend much longer in prosecution, cite more prior art, and are abandoned and
refiled more frequently.12 As to value distribution, the chemical and
pharmaceutical industries hold patents with more consistent value.13 As to scope,
the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors are characterized by a patent-to-product
correspondence, where a single patent normally covers a single product, new
chemical, or a new use for that chemical.14 And in industries such as
pharmaceuticals, characterized by patent-to-product correspondence, patent
portfolios are rare: pharmaceutical companies may seek a few patents covering the
same pharmaceutical product, thus patenting metabolites, extended release
formulations, enantiomers, or processes of use.15 These patents are usually used to
try to extend patent life: rather than creating a “thicket” of patents surrounding a
complex of products,16 they create a “cluster” of patents surrounding one product
or technology to prolong the protection (and related income) of a blockbuster.17
Based on the overwhelming economic evidence that innovation and patent
patterns are different in different industries, Burk and Lemley conclude that a
8. Id. at 33.
9. Id. at 49 (with reference to Jean O. Lanjouw & Iain Cockburn, Do Patents Matter? Empirical
Evidence After GATT (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working No. 7495, 2000)). However, compared to
other industries, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries do not patent intensely, at least not
in Europe. The European Patent Office (EPO) statistics of 2008 clearly show that the top of the
leading twenty-five applicants were again Philips, Siemens (now up to second place), and Samsung.
Not a single pharmaceutical or biotechnology company, apart from Bayer, was listed in the top
twenty-five. See European Patent Office, Leading Applicants and Patentees in 2008, EPO Annual Report
21 (2008).
10. Id. at 4.
11. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
12. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 41. See also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s
Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2124–32 (2000).
13. Id. See also Schankerman, supra note 5.
14. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 53.
15. Id. at 55.
16. Id. at 55.
17. See EUR. COMM’N, Final Report of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, Communication
from the Commission l (July 8, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals
/inquiry/communication_en.pdf.
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purely unitary system no longer fits the diverse needs of technology innovation.
Burk and Lemley put forward a twofold solution. The authors first claim that an
adequate response to industry-specific innovation and patent patterns requires
tailoring the unitary patent rules to the needs of the different industries, rather
than splitting the unitary patent system into industry-specific protection statutes.18
The great flexibility in the patent statute presents an opportunity to take account
of the needs and characteristics of different industries.19 The authors further argue
that an adequate solution also requires letting the courts carry out the tailoring,
rather than the Congress or the Patent Office.20 Courts have substantial ability to
profile an industry inductively by hearing cases presenting recurrent themes.21
Courts are equipped with precisely such discretion via a series of doctrinal policy
levers.22 Policy levers permit to take account of the technology-specific nature of
the patent system without inviting the rent-seeking and balkanization that
specialized statutes would engender.23
1.2. Objective and Scope of the Present Study
The major objective of the present study is to discern policy levers in
European patent law in biotechnology. We aim to portray specific policy levers as
introduced by the European legislature in the sector of biotechnology and paint
the way in which particular policy levers have been deployed in European case law
to enhance innovation in biotechnology. By sketching the situation in Europe, we
attempt to enrich the conversation by providing an interesting measure for
comparison with U.S. policy levers.
Before we start our European quest, let us first take a closer look at the
concepts which are quintessential to our study.
1.2.1. European patent law
The present study will watch out for policy levers in European patent law, in
other words in European legislation and case law. Given the civil law tradition in
Europe, it is quite likely that we will not only uncover relevant policy levers that
have been created not only by courts, but even more so by legislators sensitive to
the needs and characteristics of different industries. Apart from courts applying
the patent system differently, the legislatures may have created specific rules

18. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 5.
19. Id. at 109.
20. Id. at 5. The authors reject the conclusion that different patent standards should be
legislated for each different industry, and instead suggest a flexible common law approach of ongoing
judicial oversight, which incorporates a dynamically interpreted statute, in order to meet the needs of
so many disruptive industries. Id. at 95, 103.
21. Id. at 105–06.
22. Id. at 104.
23. Id. at 95.
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within specific industries as well.
Legislation
In Europe, patent legislation relevant to biotechnology comes about at three
distinct levels: the national level, the European-EPO level, and the European-EU
level. This needs some further explanation. For the time being, it is possible to
obtain patent protection in Europe by separate application to each of the national
Patent Offices within Europe (the so-called National Route). Almost every
country within Europe has its own patent system as well as a Patent Office or
equivalent bureaucracy to screen patent applications and to decide whether
patents should be awarded. However, the disadvantage of a national patent is that
it only offers protection in one country, and hence most applicants opt for a
European patent through the European Patent Office (EPO) (the so-called
European Route). On the basis of a single application and examination procedure,
it is possible to protect an invention in up to thirty-eight European countries, all
contracting states that have ratified the European Patent Convention (EPC).24
After the uniform application and granting procedure have led to the deliverance
of a patent by the EPO, the patent is then broken up into a bundle of national
patents that are further subject to national legislation, and more particularly, to
national rules with regard to nullification and impairment (see Art. 2 (2) and Art.
64 (1) EPC).25 Note the European patent is granted by the EPO, an independent
international organization, which is not part of the institutional framework of the
European Union (EU). European patents have nothing to do with the EU except
that all EU member states have also signed the EPC.
However, in a direct bid to resolve some lacunae and clarify some confusing
obscurities with regard to biopatenting in the EPC, and to harmonize EU member
states’ emerging legislations in this field, the EU meddled in the debate. The EU
interference led to the adoption of a Directive on the legal protection of
biotechnological inventions in 1998 (EU Biotechnology Directive).26 At the same
time, although the EU has no authority over the EPO, the EU Biotechnology
24. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 5,
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (entered into force Oct. 7, 1977), as amended by the Act revising the
Convention on the Grant of European Patents of Nov. 29, 2000 (entered into force Dec. 13, 2007),
its Implementing Regulations, Protocols, and Rules Relating to Fees [hereinafter European Patent
Convention].
25. See id. art. 2(2) (“The European patent shall, in each of the Contracting States for which it
is granted, have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by
that State, unless otherwise provided in this Convention.”); id. art. 64(1) (“A European patent shall,
subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, confer on its proprietor from the date of publication of the
mention of its grant, in each Contracting State in respect of which it is granted, the same rights as
would be conferred by a national patent granted in that State.”).
26. Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on
the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 (EC) [hereinafter EU
Biotechnology Directive].
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Directive also represented a subtle attempt to steer the granting policy of the EPO
in the field of biotechnology indirectly. The EU Biotechnology Directive was
indeed incorporated into the EPC in 1999,27 thus providing more detailed
guidelines for the EPO with regard to the patenting of biotechnological
inventions.
The present study will solely focus on European patents and not deal with
nationally acquired patents. In view of the previous, statutes at all three legislative
levels will thus (have to) be examined: First, the European EPO-level, including
the EPC and its Implementing Regulations (IRs),28 which are an integral part of
the EPC.29 The EPO Examination Guidelines30 will not systematically be
discussed. Second, the European EU-level, encompassing the EU Biotechnology
Directive. Third, the national level, focusing on a selection of national patent acts,
in particular the patent acts of Belgium, the Netherlands, and France.
Case law
In Europe, case law on patents may emerge at the same three levels: the
national level, the European-EPO level, and the European-EU level. Indeed, case
law will develop within three distinct institutional constellations: the national
courts, the EPO and—exceptionally—the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU). The national courts apply and discuss the scope of national patent
acts in the framework of purely national or European patents. The Technical
Boards of Appeal and the Enlarged Board of Appeal apply and interpret the EPC.
The Court of Justice of the European Union may provide rulings on patent law, in
response to questions triggered by national courts.31
27. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, pt. II, ch. V, r. 26–29 (Implementing
Regulations inserted by decision of the Administrative Council of June 16, 1999, which entered into
force on Sept. 1, 1999.
28. A package of new measures amending the European Patent Convention Implementing
Regulations entered into force on Apr. 1, 2010. These measures affect search, examination, and time
limits for the filing of divisional applications. The amendments aim to improve the quality of
incoming patent applications and expedite the grant process. The changes will allow examiners to
better coordinate with applicants and therefore enhance the legal certainty for the third parties and
public, consequently improving the quality of patent information, among other things. The present
study could not take into account this newest version of the Implementing Regulations, as this
version was not available when preparing and writing the present paper. For more information, see
Realigning the European Patent Grant Procedure, EUR. PATENT OFFICE (Mar. 30, 2010), http:
//www.epo.org/topics/news/2010/20102903.html.
29. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 931/95 (Sept. 8,
2000), O.J. E.P.O. 441 (2000) (Pension Benefit Systems Partnership).
30. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the
European Patent Office. By decision of the President of the EPO dated Nov. 19, 2009, and after
consultation with the Standing Advisory Committee before the EPO (SACEPO), the Guidelines for
Examination have also been amended. The amended Guidelines will apply as from Apr. 1, 2010. As
the amended Guidelines were published on the EPO website in Nov. 2009, the newest version has
been taken into account in the present paper, whenever cited.
31. For the time being, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) cannot respond
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For the present study, we mainly examine the case law of the EPO. Further
research needs to be done to complement this analysis with a study of
biotechnology-related case law of the courts in EPC-contracting states, and the
rather limited case law of the CJEU.32
1.2.2. Policy levers
The present study will adopt the Samuelson and Scotchmer concept of
policy levers and apply the Burk and Lemley macro/micro classification, but will
deviate somewhat from the Burk and Lemley policy lever categories.
According to Samuelson and Scotchmer, all intellectual property rights
regimes—patent, copyright, trademark—have certain policy levers in common,
wielded to a greater or lesser extent. Policy levers include, for example, length of
protection, breadth of protection, and some fair use or policy-based limitations on
the scope of protection. By handling the available policy levers appropriately, legal
regimes can be made sensitive to the technological and industrial contexts they
regulate.33
Burk and Lemley build on the Samuelson and Scotchmer concept and
identify a number of additional policy levers that already exist in patent
jurisprudence to tailor the unitary patent system to the more complex realities of
the world, such as eligible subject matter (abstract ideas), patentability
requirements (nonobviousness and secondary indicia, utility), skilled person,
enabling disclosure, pioneering patents, and experimental use.34 The levers are not,
by any means, the only sources of judicial discretion in patent law. Burk and
Lemley have concentrated on policy levers that seem to require, or at least permit,
systematic variation in patent rules by industry.
Burk and Lemley distinguish between macro and micro policy levers. Some
policy levers operate on a macro level: they expressly treat different industries
differently. Macro level policy levers may require courts to differentiate between
industries (for example, treating biotechnological inventions differently than
software inventions) or to focus on particular technologies (for example, treating

to questions arising within the EPO. See infra, note 32.
32. See Case C-34/10, Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., Oct. 18, 2011, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6 (a request from the German Bundesgerichtshof (the Federal
Court of Justice) of Dec. 17, 2009 concerning the ability of an inventor to patent methods and
products involving the use of human embryonic stem cells (Article 6 of the EU Biotechnology
Directive)); see also Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, July 6, 2010, 2010 E.C.R. 7,
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (a request from the Dutch court of ‘s Gravenhage
of Sept. 24, 2008 concerning the scope of patent claims for transgenic plants (Articles 8 and 9 of the
EU Biotechnology Directive)).
33. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111
YALE L.J. 1575, 1581 (2002).
34. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 109.
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DNA differently than other technologies, for certain purposes).35 A more
common set of policy levers operate on the micro level: they treat different
inventions differently without express regard to industry.36 Micro policy levers
apply to inventions in all industries, but have particular significance for certain
industries.37 In other words, at the micro level, many of the characteristics that are
not expressly industry-specific are nonetheless factors that vary systematically by
industry.38
Burk and Lemley describe a dozen policy levers courts already use to
differentiate patent law in different industries. They split them up into three major
categories: (1) patent acquisition and validity, (2) patent scope, and (3) remedies
for patent infringement. We will break up the policy levers in the following three
categories: (1) patent acquisition, (2) patent scope, and (3) patent rights and
limitations. This differing classification is rooted in the current institutional-legal
architecture, in which the EPO and European patents operate. In particular, our
classification is based on the allocation of competences in European patent law
and the foundational distinction between existence/exercise of patent rights. (See
Table 1. Relation between categories of policy levers and allocation of
competences for European patents).

Table 1. Relation between categories of policy levers and allocation of
competences for European patents
Function

Policy Lever

Relating to the coming
into existence of patents
(Pre-grant levers)
Relating to the exercise
of patents
(Post-grant levers)

1. Patent acquisition
2. Patent scope
3. Patent rights &
limitations

Level of regulatory
competence
EPO

EPC contracting states
(+ EU)

The first two categories of policy levers—patent acquisition and patent
scope—both relate to the coming into existence of patent rights: what policy levers
can legislators and courts employ to modulate the coming into existence of patent
rights in different sectors? The third category of policy levers—patent rights and
limitations—relates to the exercise of patent rights: what policy levers can be
observed to shape and limit patent rights? The first two categories are pre-grant

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 109, 129.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 129.
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policy levers, whereas the last category is a post-grant policy lever. According to
prevailing case law, policy levers relating to rules or standards that affect the
coming into existence and the scope of the patent—i.e., the determination of which
subject matter is protected, and the extent of protection conferred by a patent—
are the exclusive competence of the EPO.39 Policy levers relating to standards that
deal with the exercise of rights of the patentee—i.e., the rights conferred by a patent
upon patentee, and the determination of how subject matter is protected—are the
competence of the EPO contracting states, and may come under the scrutiny of
the EU.40
We expect that this division of competences will be reflected in the type of
actors (legislators vs. courts; EPC Boards vs. national courts) putting policy levers
into operation in Europe.
1.2.3. Biotechnology
In the framework of the present study, four general categories of
biotechnological inventions have been envisaged: First and foremost, human
DNA sequences, in the context of recombinant production of human therapeutic
proteins, as well as in the context of genetic testing. Second, human stem cells.
Third, transgenic plants and transgenic plant cells (lesser attention is paid to
biological processes for the production of plants). Last but not least, transgenic
animals and animal cells.
The policy levers employed in the area of chemistry and pharmacy, bearing
relevance for biotechnology, will also be discussed.
2. BIOTECH-SPECIFIC POLICY LEVERS IN EUROPE
2.1. Patent Acquisition
Now that the objective and scope of the present study have been set forth,
let us start our European quest for policy levers. We kick off by screening the
elements pertaining to the acquisition of patents. In Europe, patents are available
for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve
an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application (Art. 52 (1) EPC),
and disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be
39. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 02/88
101 (Dec. 11, 1989) (Mobil Oil III) (Reason 3.3).
40. See Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Case T-78/80, Deutsche
Grammophon v. Metro, 1971 EUR-Lex. CELEX 61970C0078, at 499–500 (Apr. 28, 1971), Reason
11 (“Amongst the prohibitions or restrictions on the free movement of goods which it concedes Art.
36 refers to industrial and commercial property. On the assumption that those provisions may be
relevant to a right related to copyright, it is nevertheless clear from that article that, although the treaty
does not affect the existence of rights recognized by the legislation of a member state with regard to
industrial and commercial property, the exercise of such rights may nevertheless fall within the
prohibitions laid down by the treaty.”).
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carried out by a person skilled in the art (Art. 83 EPC). In the U.S., patents are
awarded for any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof (35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010)),
provided that the patent specification contains a written description of the
invention in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, to make and use the same, thereby setting
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention
(35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010)).
In what follows, we will examine how legislators and courts have modulated
the basic requirements for patent acquisition—patentable subject matter, novelty,
inventive step/nonobviousness, industrial applicability/utility, and enabling
disclosure—to accommodate inventions in the field of biotechnology.
2.1.1. Patentable subject matter—inventions and discoveries
In general
In the U.S., the Utility Patent Act (UPA) defines subject matter eligibility in a
positive way—focusing on classes of invention—and leaves the exclusions to the
courts. The EPC develops a positive approach—focusing on the invention
concept—and immediately adds a series of negative definitions and exclusions.
The EPC states that some subject matter “shall not be regarded as inventions”
(Art. 52 (2) EPC). Both the U.S. and European approaches are permissible under
the TRIPs Agreement, stating that “Members may exclude from patentability”
certain inventions (Art. 27 (2) and (3) TRIPs Agreement).
Defining patentable subject matter under U.S. patent law hinges upon
statutory subject matter categories. According to U.S. patent law, patent
protection can be awarded only when the invention falls within at least one of the
four classes of statutory subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, or
compositions of matter (35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010)). Over the years, wide attention
has been paid to the exact scope of the “great and distinct classes.”41 In 1980, the
debate came to an end when the Supreme Court, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
interpreted these statutory classes expansively to encompass “anything under the
sun that is made by man.”42 In U.S. patent law, far less attention has been
accorded to the interpretation of the term “invention.” The UPA indicates that
the term invention means “invention or discovery” (35 U.S.C. § 100 (2010)),
providing little help on the issue. Courts and commentators have labored to settle
on a universally applicable definition.43 It has been suggested that any inquiry into
41. Ex parte Blythe, 1885 Comm’r Pat. 1885.
42. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)
43. See Manya S. Deehr & William C. Rooklidge, The Stage of Development of an Invention Subject to
the On-Sale Bar to Patentability, reprinted in PRINCIPLES OF PATENTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 380
(Donald Chisum et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004). See also Paul M. Janicke, The Varied Meanings of Invention in
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patentable subject matter should look into “the essential characteristics of the
subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.”44
Outlining patentable subject matter under European patent law revolves
around the notion of invention: European patents shall be granted for any
inventions provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are
susceptible of industrial application (Art. 52 1 EPC). The EPC, however, does not
provide a definition of this key concept and does not expressly define what an
invention is. The EPC Implementing Regulations hint at the technical character of
an invention, when they prescribe that the description shall specify the technical
field to which the invention relates (Rule 42 (1) (a) EPC IRs); that the description
shall disclose the invention, as claimed, in such terms that the technical problem,
even if not expressly stated as such, and its solution can be understood
(Rule 42 (1) (c) EPC IRs); and that the claims shall define the matter for which
protection is sought in terms of the technical features of the invention
(Rule 43 (1) EPC IRs). The Technical Boards of Appeal from their side take the
view that the use of the term invention in Art. 52 (1) EPC, read in conjunction
with the list of so-called non-inventions or “Nicht Erfindugen”45 in Art. 52 (2)
and (3) EPC, implies a requirement of technical character or technicality, which is
to be fulfilled by an invention as claimed in order to be patentable. An invention
may be an invention within the meaning of Art. 52 (1) EPC if a technical effect is
achieved by the invention or if technical considerations are required to carry out
the invention. The term “invention” is to be construed as subject matter having
technical character, and having technical character is an implicit requirement of
the EPC to be met by an invention in order to be an invention within the meaning
of Art. 52 (1) EPC.46
Patent Practice: Different Meanings in Different Situations, reprinted in PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES App. 1
(Donald R. Dunner ed., 1970).
44. State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
45. Rainer Moufang, Kommentierung des Europäischen Patentübereinkommen. Artikel 53: Ausnahmen
PATENTÜBEREINKOMMEN. MÜNCHNER
von
der
Patentierbarkeit, in EUROPÄISCHES
GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR 15 (1991).
46. European Patent Office, Decision of the Technical Board of Appeal, T 931/95 (Sept. 8,
2000), 2001 O.J. E.P.O. (C 10) 441 (Pension Benefit Systems Partnership) relating to
EP No. 0 332 770. The Board agreed with the appellant that in order to be patentable there is not an
explicit requirement of technical character of an invention under European Patent Convention (supra
note 24) Art. 52, or under any other provisions of the European Patent Convention, which is
concerned with substantive patent law. The European Patent Convention (supra note 24) Art. 52, and
in particular in its paragraph 1, only makes it clear that for something to be patentable, it must be an
invention. However, having regard to the case law of the Boards of Appeal and taking into account
the frequent use of the term “technical” in the European Patent Convention (supra note 24), and the
Implementing Regulations, which are an integral part of the European Patent Convention, and having
due regard to the context in which the term “technical” is used there, the Board was of the opinion
that the requirement of technical character is inherent to the notion “invention” as it occurs in
European Patent Convention (supra note 24) Art. 52(1). Thus, the Board concluded that having
technical character is an implicit requirement of the European Patent Convention to be an invention
within the meaning of European Patent Convention Art. 52(1), following the decisions of the
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In biotechnology
In the U.S., the debate on eligible subject matter in the realm of
biotechnology was recently reopened. Exactly thirty years after the trendsetting
Chakrabarty decision, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
ruled that genes are to be regarded as discoveries and should be excluded from
patentability.47 Is the pendulum swinging back in biotechnology?48
The EPC invention concept and the requirement of technical character have
had a clear influence in the field of biotechnology, especially when the
patentability of DNA was discussed. Some scholars took the view that DNA was
an element of nature that had to be regarded as a discovery, and was therefore not
patentable (Art. 52 (2) (a) EPC). Others argued that DNA was an invention as it
required technical skill and human intervention to isolate from its natural
environment.
The heated discussion on the discovery nature of DNA was resolved by the
EU Biotechnology Directive, stipulating “that biological material which is isolated
from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical process even if
it previously occurred in nature” shall also be patentable (Art. 3 (2) Directive;
Rule 27 (a) EPC IRs). With regard to DNA sequences, the EU Biotechnology
Directive stipulated more in particular that “the human body, at the various stages
of its formation and development, and the simple discovery of one of its elements,
including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable
inventions” (Art. 5 (1) Directive; Rule 29 (1) EPC IRs), whereas “an element
isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical
process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a
patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a
natural element” (Art. 5 (2) Directive; Rule 29 (2) EPC IRs). This approach,
introducing a distinction between (unpatentable) discoveries and (patentable)
inventions in the field of DNA research has been fiercely criticized. However, the
EU and the EPO maintain the distinction between DNA in nature, which is
considered a discovery, and isolated DNA, which can amount to an invention
thanks to a technical intervention.
Policy lever
The technical character rule is a micro policy lever, applying to inventions in
all industries, but with particular significance for certain industries, in casu
biotechnology. The technical character rule and its application to DNA have
European Patent Office, Technical Board of Appeal T 1173/97 (July 1, 1998), O.J. E.P.O (G 6) 15
and 16 1998 (Reason 6).
47. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d. 365
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
48. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Gene Patenting—Is the Pendulum Swinging
Back?, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1855, 1855–58 (2010).
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consciously been employed as a policy lever to fuel innovation in the
biotechnology sector. Originated as a judicial policy lever, the technical character
rule is now formally embedded in the EU Biotechnology Directive, which makes
it a statutory policy lever. The EU Biotechnology Directive bears strong witness of
the endeavor to stimulate biotechnology innovation through recognition of
biological developments as inventions.49
However, recent investigations have pointed to the potential detrimental
effect all that many DNA patents may have on further research and development,
and on access to healthcare. The omnipresence of patents for DNA may produce
an anti-commons effect, threatening rather than stimulating downstream
innovation.50 At present, it is being examined to what extent new models of
collaborative licensing may facilitate access to gene patents and render clusters of
patents more readily available for use in research and healthcare.51

49. See Preambles 1 and 2 of EU Biotechnology Directive, supra note 26, at 13 (“(1) Whereas
biotechnology and genetic engineering are playing an increasingly important role in a broad range of
industries and the protection of biotechnological inventions will certainly be of fundamental
importance for the Community’s industrial development; (2) Whereas, in particular in the field of
genetic engineering, research and development require a considerable amount of high-risk investment
and therefore only adequate legal protection can make them profitable.”).
50. The alarming and trendsetting article came from Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 698–701 (1998). Since then, a vast body of literature providing empirical
evidence emerged. Most empirical studies focus on the issuance of human gene patents by patent
authorities. See, e.g., Michael M. Hopkins et al., DNA Patenting: The End of an Era?, 25 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 185, 185–87 (2007); MICHAEL M. HOPKINS ET AL., THE PATENTING OF HUMAN
DNA: GLOBAL TRENDS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITY (THE PATGEN PROJECT), A
REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME PRIORITY: FP62003-LIFESCIHEALTH-II (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/documents
/patgen_finalreport.pdf; Isabelle Huys, Nele Berthels, Gert Matthijs & Geertrui Van Overwalle., Legal
Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 903, 903–09 (2009);
Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239,
239–40 (2005); COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND PROTEIN
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF
GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND
PUBLIC HEALTH (2005); Birgit Verbeure et al., Analysing DNA Patents in Relation with Diagnostic Genetic
Testing, 14 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 26, 26–33 (2006); John P. Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters:
Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research, 36 RES. POL. 1184, 1184–203 (2007).
See also Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: Experimental Evidence of
Anticommons Tragedies, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 1–25 (2006). Some empirical studies focus on gene
patents that have been asserted in court to assess the actual restrictive effect of patents. See, e.g.,
Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey of Human
Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 295–362 (2007). See also Ann E. Mills & Patti Tereskerz,
DNA-Based Patents: An Empirical Analysis, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 993, 993–95 (2008).
51. See Geertrui Van Overwalle, Of Thickets, Blocks and Gaps: Designing Tools to Resolve Obstacles in
the Gene Patents Landscape, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT
POOLS, CLEARING HOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES 381, 381–463
(Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009).
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2.1.2. Patentable subject matter—morality
In general
In U.S. patent law, it has been suggested that the utility requirement
encompasses a morality test and that the PTO has to examine whether the
invention achieves a human purpose that is not illegal, immoral, or contrary to
public policy.52 In the last decades, however, the courts and the PTO have
virtually abandoned the requirement that an invention is morally beneficial.53
European patent law also contains a morality test, but one that is formally
and explicitly embedded in patent law. The EPC sets forth that European patents
shall not be granted in respect of inventions the commercial exploitation of which
would be contrary to ordre public or morality. Such exploitation shall not be deemed
to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or
all of the EPC contracting states (Art. 53 (a) EPC).
EPO case law indicates that the exception has to be narrowly construed. The
commercial exploitation of an invention must be in conflict with ordre public or
morality, not just prohibited by statutory law.54 In other words, being forbidden by
law and creating a possible conflict with simple statutory law, does not suffice to
lead to a rejection under Art. 53 (a) EPC.
In biotechnology
In the U.S., morality hardly seems to have played a role in biotechnology
patenting. The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly stated in the Chakrabarty case that it
is not competent to rule on ecological and ethical matters and that such issues
should be addressed by the political branches of government, i.e. the Congress
and the Executive, instead of the courts.55 Only recently, Congress intervened and
explicitly prohibited issuing patents for genetically modified humans.56
In Europe, the morality clause figured discretely in patent law without
causing a great stir for quite some time. With the advent of biotechnology,
52. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.01 (2006). The unpatentability of immoral
subject matter seems to have originated with Justice Story’s opinion in Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37
(C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217).
53. CHISUM, supra note 52, at 751. See also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 53, 111; the
patents cited, supra note 6; Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System
and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 469 (1988).
54. Rainier Moufang, The Concept of ‘Ordre Public’ and Morality in Patent Law, in OCTROOIRECHT,
ETHIEK EN BIOTECHNOLOGIE [PATENT LAW, ETHICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY] 65 (Geertrui Van
Overwalle ed., 1998).
55. Geertrui Van Overwalle, Biotechnology Patents in Europe: From Law to Ethics, in
BIOTECHNOLOGY, PATENTS AND MORALITY 139, 148 (Sigrid Sterckx ed., 1997).
56. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108199, § 634 (2005) (“None of
the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this Act may be used to issue patents on
claims directed to or encompassing a human organism.”). See also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at
96.
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however, the morality clause rigorously stepped into the limelight.57 It was felt that
the ambivalence of biotechnology made the necessity of ethical monitoring more
urgent. Although the confrontation of ethics and patent law is difficult, to say the
least, and usually ethics are seen in this context as a disturbance—as the grosse
Störung 58—the ethical assessment of biotechnological inventions and related
patents have always been high on the agenda in Europe.
Initially, the ethical debate took place at the EPO level, because
Art. 53 (a) EPC is the sole yardstick available to guide the EPO in delicate
questions on the patentability of living material.59 Long after the first patents for
human genes had been granted in the context of recombinant DNA technology as
a matter of routine,60 the morality of gene patents became an issue. The ethics of
gene patenting was fiercely debated when a patent coding for human relaxin was
granted (Howard Florey Institute case).61 On opposition, the EPO Opposition
Division concluded that an invention concerning a human gene was not an
exception to patentability,
[B]ecause it would not be universally regarded as outrageous: it
did not amount to patenting life because DNA as such was not
life but one of the many chemical entities participating in
biological processes, and no offence to human dignity had

57. An interesting table for comparison is provided by WIPO, listing subject matter which has
been excluded in the past—partly—on the basis of public interest lever or the product of nature
doctrine: forty-four out of ninety-two countries excluded pharmaceutical products from their field of
patent protection; forty-four out of ninety-two excluded biological methods; forty-four out of ninetytwo excluded therapeutic methods; thirty-five out of ninety-two excluded food; twenty-two out of
ninety-two excluded chemical compounds. World Intellectual Property Organization, Existence, Scope
and Form of Generally Internationally Accepted and Applied Standards/Norms for the Protecting of Intellectual
Property, WIPO Doc. WO/INF/29 (1988).
58. See Van Overwalle, supra note 55.
59. The morality clause triggered reflection and debate in some adjacent areas as well, such as
informed consent and traditional knowledge. These issues will not be discussed here. For more, see
Geertrui Van Overwalle, Biotechnology and Patents: Global Standards, European Approaches and National
Accents, in GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM 77 (Daniel Wüger & Thomas
Cottier eds., 2008).
60. European patents have been granted for the majority of recombinant DNA achievements.
Thus, a European patent was issued for the production of -type interferon, γ-type interferon,
clotting factor Factor VIII, tissue-type plasminogen activator or t-PA, erythropoietin (EPO), among
others. A good example in this connection is the patent granted for -type interferon. An
examination of the description and patent claims of the interferon patent reveals that protection was
granted for a well-defined DNA sequence, a recombinant DNA molecule, a host transformed with
said recombinant DNA molecule, an -type interferon produced by said transformed host, a process
for producing the recombinant DNA molecules, a process for the transformation of the host, and a
process for the production of an -type interferon. For details, see GEERTRUI VAN OVERWALLE,
THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED
STATES: CURRENT FRAMEWORK AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS (1997).
61. See European Patent No. 0 112 149 (B1) (granted Apr. 10, 1991). Granted claim 1 reads as
follows: “1. A DNA fragment encoding human H2-preprorelaxin, said H2-preprorelaxin having the
amino-acid sequence set out in Figure 2.”
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occurred as the woman who donated tissue was asked for her
consent and her self-determination was not affected by the
exploitation of the claimed molecules.62
The EPO Technical Boards of Appeal later confirmed the Opposition point
of view and concluded that the human gene patent claim was allowable.63
The question of morality and plants came up with the grant of a patent on a
genetically modified plant (Lubrizol case).64 On opposition, the EPO Opposition
Division decided that the exclusion of patentability in Art. 53 (a) EPC for
inventions, which are contrary to public order and morality, concern only extreme
cases which are universally regarded as abhorrent. In view of the consideration
that the actual patent related to an invention that might be used for creating new
plants, the nutritive value of which is increased in comparison with conventionally
obtained plants, and that the plants covered by said patent might give rise to a
better management of food shortage in the world, the Opposition Division ruled
that the exploitation of such an invention could not therefore be considered
immoral or against public order and decided that a violation of Art. 53 (a) EPC
was not apparent.65 In a later plant patent case (Plant Genetic Systems),66 the
Opposition Division reached a similar decision.67 On appeal, the Technical Board
of Appeal specified the twin concepts ordre public and morality in the latter case.
The Board set forth that the concept of ordre public covers the protection of public
security and the physical integrity of individuals as part of society, and the
protection of the environment.68 The Board added that the concept of morality is

62. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case V 8/94 (Aug. 30, 1984),
O.J. E.P.O., 388 (1995).
63. To assess the validity of the arguments put forward, European Patent Convention, supra
note 24, Art. 53(a) was interpreted in the light of (the then-implemented) EU Biotechnology
Directive, Art. 5 (Rule 29 Implementing Regulations European Patent Convention). See Decision of
the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 0272/95 (Oct. 23, 2002).
64. See European Patent No. 0 122 791 (B1) (granted Mar. 29, 1989), in particular granted
claims 10 and 19. The present study only discusses the possible exclusion of transgenic plants on
morality grounds, and will not enter into the complex legal-technical debate on the exclusion of plant
varieties. For an in-depth analysis of that debate, and the current state of play, see MARGARET
LLEWELYN & MIKE ADCOCK, EUROPEAN PLANT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 551 (2006); Geertrui
Van Overwalle, Patent Protection for Plants: A Comparison of American and European Approaches, 39 IDEA
143, 143–94 (1999). See also Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case
T 1054/96 (Oct. 13, 1997) (Novartis), O.J. E.P.O., 511 (1998); Decision of the European Patent
Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 1/98 (Dec. 20, 1999) (Novartis), O.J. E.P.O. 111–41
(2000), European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 1054/96 (Dec. 6, 2000).
65. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Opposition Division, Mar. 31, 1992 (quoted
in European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T694/92 (May 8, 1996)).
66. See European Patent No. 0 242 236 (B1) (issued Oct. 10, 1990) (entitled “Plant cells
resistant to glutamine synthetase inhibitors, made by genetic engineering”).
67. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Opposition Division, (Dec. 15 1992), INT’L
R. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. (IIC), 618 (1993).
68. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 356/93 (Feb. 21,
1995), O.J. E.P.O. 557 (1995). See id. at 560 (Reason 14).
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related to the belief that some behavior is right and acceptable, whereas other
behavior is wrong, this belief being founded on the totality of the accepted norms
which are deeply rooted in a particular culture.69 The Board concluded that the
evidence provided by the appellant did not lead to the definite conclusion that the
exploitation of the invention would seriously prejudice the environment and run
counter to ordre public,70 and that plant biotechnology per se cannot be regarded as
being more contrary to public morality than traditional selective breeding.71
The issues of ethics and animals were heavily discussed with the (first
refused, but later granted) patent for a transgenic mouse (Harvard onco-mouse
case).72 The Technical Board of Appeal clearly stated that for each individual
invention the question of morality had to be examined, and possible detrimental
effects and risks had to be weighed and balanced against the merits and
advantages aimed at.73 On further proceedings, it was confirmed that in the
present case, the medical benefit outweighed the harm caused.74
The prevailing EPO viewpoints on ethics and biopatenting were later
consolidated by the EU legislator in the EU Biotechnology Directive. First and
foremost, the Directive recognizes the EPO policy on human gene patenting by
explicitly confirming the patentability of human genes (Art. 5 Directive).
Furthermore, the Directive formally copied the EPC morality clause
(Art. 6 (1) Directive) and additionally provided a nonexhaustive list of inventions
that shall be considered unpatentable for ethical non-compliance: processes for
cloning human beings, processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of
human beings, uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes, and
processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause
them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to humans or animals and
also animals resulting from such processes (Art. 6(2) Directive). By well
deliberating which exceptions to include and not, the Directive enshrined the
EPO approach with regard to transgenic plants (allowable, hence not listed) and

69. See id. at 557 (Reason 6).
70. See id. at 566 (Reason 18.6).
71. See id. at 562 (Reason 17.1).
72. See European Patent No. 0 169 672 (B1) (issued May 13, 1992) (entitled “Method for
Producing Transgenic Animals”).
73. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 19/90 476 (Oct. 3,
1990), O.J. E.P.O. 476 (1990); Decision of the European Patent Office, Examining Division (Apr. 3,
1992), O.J. E.P.O. 591 (1992).
74. Without discussing this case in too much detail, it is relevant to note that on the basis of
the morality clause, as worded in Art. 6 of the EU Biotechnology Directive, supra note 26, and
operationalized in the European Patent Convention through its Implementing Regulations, supra note
25, the Opposition Division limited the patent to rodents (European Patent Office, Interlocutory
Decision of the Opposition Division (Nov. 7, 2001) (unpublished) (concerning maintenance of
European Patent No. 0 169 672 in amended form)), and the Board of Appeal further limited the
patent to transgenic mice (Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 315/03
246 (July 6, 2004)).
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transgenic animals (allowable, after a case by case balancing act, hence listed).
Somewhat unfortunately, some issues remained unclear under the EU
Biotechnology Directive.75 One of the outstanding issues relates to human
embryonic stem cell patents. With the ascendancy of stem cell technology, the
question of whether stem cells of human origin can be considered patentable has
arisen. To what extent does Art. 5 of the Directive apply to human stem cells and
what guidance can be found in Art. 6 of the Directive?76 The EPO became the
focal level for guidance again and recently concluded (in the Thomson case)77 that
the morality clause forbids the patenting of claims directed to products that at the
filing date could be prepared exclusively by a method which necessarily involved
the destruction of the human embryos from which the said products are derived,
even if the said method is not part of the claims.78
Policy lever
In Europe, in principle, any invention in any field of technology has to be
eligible under the ethical clause. However, the morality rule is put to test more
often in biotechnology than in other industries. As a result, in Europe morality
functions as a significant restriction on patenting in biotechnology. The morality
doctrine therefore is a micro policy lever that is applied to exclude patents for
certain life forms. Initially proclaimed in the EPC, the morality doctrine was
further developed by the Opposition Division and the Technical Boards of
Appeal of the EPO, turning the doctrine into a judicial micro policy lever. Later
on, the EPO case law was embedded in biotechnology-specific statutes, namely
the EU Biotechnology Directive, thus shaping the doctrine as a statutory policy
lever.
Patent law should undoubtedly take into account ethical concerns and pay
75. For a discussion, see Geertrui Van Overwalle, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Bio-Patenting:
Critical Analysis of the EU Biotechnology Directive, in DEATH OF PATENTS 212–27 (Peter Drahos ed.,
2005).
76. See Van Overwalle, supra note 75.
77. See Claim 1 of the European Patent Application No. EP 0 770 125 (submitted Jan. 20,
1995) by Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) (entitled “Primate embryonic stem cells”).
The Examining Division decided on July 13, 2004 to refuse said patent application.
78. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 0002/06
(Nov. 25, 2008) (referral from the Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case
T 1374/04). There is a vast amount of literature on this case and on human stem cells in general. See,
e.g., EMBRYONIC STEM CELL PATENTS: EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND ETHICS (Aurora Plomer &
Paul Torremans eds., 2010); Geertrui Van Overwalle, Study on the Patenting of Inventions Relating to
Human Stem Cell Research (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the
European Commission [EGE], 2001); Geertrui Van Overwalle, Patenting Stem Cell Research in Europe
and in the United States, in CROSSING BORDERS: CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL
DIFFERENCES CONCERNING STEM CELL RESEARCH 519–46 (Wolfgang Bender et al. eds., 2005).
On the question of the applicability of Rule 28(c) European Patent Convention Implementing
Regulations, the Enlarged Board of the European Patent Office answered that the rule applied to all
pending applications, including those filed before it entered into force.
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special attention to the admissibility of patents for human life forms, in view of
the principles of human dignity and noncommodification. However, patent law
should only do so to the extent that it concerns matters directly and inextricably
linked with patents and the exercise of patent rights. In this regard, the question
arises whether the list of exclusions of Art. 6 (2) EU Biotechnology Directive
should be taken up in patent law, as it does not seem to aim to limit the patent
implications of certain biotech inventions, but rather wishes to exclude certain
fields of research as such. Patent law should not interfere when research is ethically
undesirable. Since a direct link is missing between ethics and patents in Art. 6 (2)
EU Biotechnology Directive, it might be conceivable to abolish this provision and
to take up these exclusions in research regulations.79 So the plea is not to abandon
the morality clause, but rather to (re)direct it to its initial goal, namely the
exclusion of inventions, the commercial exploitation of which runs counter to ordre
public and morality.
2.1.3. Patentable subject matter—medical methods
In biotechnology
A provision that only bears special significance in biotechnology in relation
to health care, and for which no U.S. counterpart could be uncovered, is the
medical method rule. The EPC puts forward that European patents shall not be
granted in respect of methods for treatment of the human or animal body by
surgery or therapy, nor in respect of diagnostic methods practiced on the human
or animal body; however this does not apply to products—in particular substances
or compositions—for use in any of these methods (Art. 53 (c) EPC). The reason
for this exclusion of medical methods is not because they are not considered
inventions, as is the case with subject matter listed under Art. 52 (2) EPC. Medical
methods can be qualified as inventions but are carved out from patent law as a
matter of policy, to ensure that those who carry out such methods as part of the
medical treatment of humans or the veterinary treatment of animals are not
inhibited by patents.80
79. See Van Overwalle, supra note 75.
80. The same policy argument was deployed under the initial European Patent Convention
1973 counterpart from this exclusion (then Art. 52(4) European Patent Convention, supra note 24),
but a different legal technique was employed to achieve the policy objective at hand. The 1973
legislator, followed by the Technical Board of Appeal, implicitly recognized that medical methods are
susceptible to industrial application as a matter of reality, but “shall not be regarded as” inventions
which are susceptible of industrial application, by way of legal fiction. See Decision of the European
Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 116/85 (Oct. 14, 1987), O.J. E.P.O. 13 (1989). In an attempt
to openly recognize the underlying policy rationale of the exclusion of medical methods, the exclusion
was rephrased and replaced as Art. 52(3)(c) by the European Patent Convention Revision Act in 2000.
For more details, see Daniel X. Thomas, Patentability Problems in Medical Technology, 34 INT’L R. OF
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 847 (2003). See also Geertrui Van Overwalle, IPR Issues and High
Quality Genetic Testing, in QUALITY ISSUES IN CLINICAL GENETIC SERVICES (Ulf Kristoffersson et al.
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Policy lever
The medical method exception was prompted by a clear concern about
guaranteeing access to life-saving treatments. This approach undoubtedly is aimed
at having effect in a very specific industry sector, namely health care. Expressly
implementing the medical method approach into patent legislation makes it a
statutory macro policy lever.
However, the manner in which the exclusion has lately been implemented in
the field of genetic diagnostics—allowing patents on diagnostic methods for
testing early onset breast and ovarian cancer based on the genes BRCA1 and
BRCA2 awarded to the U.S. company Myriad Genetics—led to some fierce
debates about the perceived limited scope of Art. 53 (c) EPC.81 It should be
noted, however, that the criticism voiced in the BRCA case was not always
directed towards the grant of patents on genes and related diagnostic methods, but
also to the restrictive licensing policy of the patent owners and their business
strategy to maximize profit.82 In Europe, one response to address undesirable
effects and unreasonable behavior from patent holders has been the introduction
of the compulsory license for public health.83
2.1.4. Novelty—first and second medical use
In general
Most patent systems require that an invention be new in order to be eligible
for patent protection. U.S. patent law stipulates that whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore (35
U.S.C. § 101 (2010)). In the same line, European patent law prescribes that
European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are susceptible of
industrial application (Art. 52 (1) EPC), and that an invention shall be considered
to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art (Art. 54 (1) EPC).
Following this general principle, patent protection can be awarded for a
substance or composition that is new. Conversely, patent protection cannot be
granted for a substance when the substance is not new but only the use or
application of that substance is new. The substance is part of the state of the art

eds., 2010) and the references cited there.
81. See GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 241 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2007) and
the references cited there.
82. A lot has been published on the Myriad BRCA saga. The interested reader might take note
of the following background publication: E. RICHARD GOLD & JULIA CARBONE, MYRIAD
GENETICS: IN THE EYE OF THE POLICY STORM (2008). See also Geertrui Van Overwalle, Turning
Patent Swords into Shares, 330 SCIENCE 1630, 1631 (2010).
83. See infra Part 2.3.2.
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and a novel use of a known substance does not modify the prior art status of said
substance or composition.
In medicine
In the medical field, however, European patent law applies a divergent rule
when it comes to the use of substances and compositions that are already part of
the state of the art. When such a known substance or composition is used for the
very first time in a surgical, therapeutic, or diagnostic method—in other words
when the use of such substance is new for such methods—patent protection can
be granted for the use in one of these methods. The EPC explicitly stipulates that
the general anticipation rules “shall not exclude the patentability of any substance
or composition, comprised in the state of the art, for use in a method referred to
in Art. 53 (c) EPC [surgical, therapeutic, or diagnostic method], provided that its
use for any such method is not comprised in the state of the art.”84
EPO jurisprudence has extended this diverging rule to known substances
which are used for second and further medical indications. On various occasions,
the Enlarged Board of Appeal indeed clarified the question whether and in what
way a known medicament for the treatment of a specific illness can be protected
for the treatment of other illnesses. The Enlarged Board stated that it is legitimate
to allow “claims directed to the use of a substance or composition for the
manufacture of a medicament for a specified new and inventive therapeutic
application, even in a case in which the process of manufacture as such does not
differ from known processes using the same active ingredient.”85 Recently, this
case law was codified and the EPC now clearly states that the general anticipation
rules shall not foreclose “the patentability of any substance or composition for any
specific use in a method referred to in Art. 53 (c) EPC [surgical, therapeutic, or
diagnostic method], provided that such use is not comprised in the state of the
art” (Art. 54 (5) EPC). In this way it is formally confirmed that also the second and
further medical use of known substances or compositions are patentable. Most
member states have adapted their national patent acts accordingly.
Last but not least, EPO jurisprudence looked into the question of whether
use claims are also permissible in nonmedical fields. Imagine the use of a chemical
compound, for example, not as a growth regulator, which is known, but as a

84.

For an in-depth analysis of the EPO case law on first medical indication, see CASE LAW OF
(Albert Ballester Rodès et al.
eds., 5th ed. Dec. 2006). See also Vol. 2: Procedural Patent Law—Article 90 to Article 178 in MARGARETE
SINGER & DIETER STAUDER, THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 127–28
(3d ed. 2003). See infra Part 2.3.2.
85. Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 5/83 (Dec. 5,
1984) O.J. E.P.O. 64 (1985). For an analysis of the case law on second and further medical use, see CASE
LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, at 104–13. See
also SINGER & STAUDER, supra note 84, at 104–13.
THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE 101–04
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fungicide, which is not yet known.86 The Enlarged Board stated that the
patentability of a second nonmedical use of a product is already recognized in
principle in the cases concerning the second medical use of a substance.87
However, in those earlier decisions the exclusion from patentability of therapeutic
and diagnostic methods had caused the Enlarged Board to allow only a special
type of claim. These specific difficulties do not arise in the nonmedical field. There
the question is of a general nature, concerned primarily with the question of
interpretation of the general rules governing novelty.88
Policy lever
In current European patent law, the novelty assessment rules have been
adapted to stimulate further research on the use of known medicaments in cases
where surgical, therapeutic, and diagnostic methods have been excluded from
patentability (Art. 53 (c) EPC), in respect of substances and compositions used in
surgical and therapeutic treatment and in diagnostic processes carried out on
humans and animals. The EPC has introduced a special concept of novelty
unknown in other technical fields. Novelty assessment has been specially shaped
to accommodate innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.89 The first medical use
rule can be considered as a statutory macro policy lever. The second medical use
rule, initially shaped as a judicial extension of the first medical use doctrine, is now
embedded in the EPC, thus acting as a statutory macro policy lever in European
patent law.
2.1.5. Novelty—selection invention
In general
In many patent systems, such as the European system, selection inventions
are considered patentable. Generally speaking, a selection invention is the
invention of a more specific technical teaching than the general one that has
already been disclosed, or put differently, a selection invention is an invention that
is a selection from a previous disclosure. Selection inventions can constitute a
substantial and nonobvious enrichment of technology and are therefore

86. This question was at stake before the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case
T 231/85 (Dec. 8, 1986), O.J. E.P.O., 74 (1989). For similar cases, see SINGER & STAUDER, supra
note 84, at 130–31.
87. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 5/83
(Dec. 5, 1984), O.J. E.P.O. 64 (1985).
88. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 2/88
(Dec. 11, 1989), O.J. E.P.O. 93 (1990); see also Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged
Board of Appeal, Case G 6/88 (Dec. 11, 1989); O.J. E.P.O. 114 (1990).
89. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 5/83
(Mar. 25, 1985) O.J. E.P.O. 65 (1985), where the Board noted that “the Technical Board of Appeal
rightly stressed its importance, particularly for the pharmaceutical industry.”
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acknowledged as being worthy of patent protection.
The recognition of selection inventions calls for particular care with regard
to the assessment of novelty and inventive step. Indeed, if all more specific
technical teachings were to be regarded as disclosed by the general teaching,
selection inventions would be excluded from patent protection, for the selection
invention would be regarded as lacking novelty.90 In that regard, the EPO
Guidelines state that a generic disclosure does not anticipate the novelty of a
specific example that falls within the terms of that disclosure, but a specific
disclosure does take away the novelty of subject matter claimed generically, e.g., a
disclosure of copper destroys novelty of metal as a generic concept, but not the
novelty of any metal other than copper.91 EPO case law has repeatedly confirmed
this approach.92
In chemistry
Although there are no specific limitations on the types of protectable
selection inventions, in practice selection inventions appear mainly in the chemical
field.93 In European patent law and practice, two types of selection inventions are
quite common in the chemical field: chemical substances and groups of substances
in respect of general formulae (so-called Markush formulae) under which they fall,
on the one hand, and products or processes defined by parameter ranges as
against known products or processes characterized by wider or overlapping
parameter ranges, on the other hand.94 The Technical Boards of Appeal have
developed considerable case law on the novelty assessment for both types of
selection inventions in the field of chemistry, and have thoughtfully developed
criteria for selection inventions.95
Policy lever
In further shaping the novelty (and inventive step) requirement(s) for
selection inventions, the selection invention doctrine can act as a judicially created
90. For some literature on this issue, see SINGER & STAUDER, supra note 84, at 124 and the
references cited there.
91. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. IV, § 9.5.
92. For an overview of relevant case law, see CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, at 87.
93. See Association Internationale pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle
[International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property] Resolution Question 209,
Selection Inventions—The Inventive Step Requirement, Other Patentability Criteria and Scope of
Protection (2009), available at https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/209/RS209English.pdf.
See also id. at Question 81—Protection of groups of chemical substances and selection inventions,
without passing a resolution on the subject.
94. See CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra
note 84, at 87–88.
95. Id. at 87–101.
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micro policy lever, nominally applying to all inventions, and assisting, for example,
in deciding how broad or generic the prior disclosure is, how narrowly the
selection invention is defined, how far removed from any specific examples
disclosed in the prior art the selection invention is, and whether the features of the
selection invention have been explicitly or implicitly described in the prior art.96
But the doctrine has major effects for specific industry sectors, namely the
chemical and pharmaceutical field. It remains to be seen if—and if so, to what
extent—this doctrine will extend to the biotechnology sector in the future.
2.1.6. Novelty—testing exemption
In general
In U.S. novelty assessment literature, experimental use plays a relevant role.97
Use or sale, which takes part in the framework of a bona fide experiment, is not
novelty destroying and does not trigger the one-year grace period.98 In the
framework of nonstatutory experimental use, courts have looked into a variety of
factors to determine whether a patentee’s use is experimental, including whether
the goods were sold, whether the patentee kept control over them, whether the
patentee sought feedback, and whether the final product changed as a result.99
In Europe a similar novelty approach seems to apply in testing cases.100 The
Technical Boards of Appeal repeatedly pointed out that a product made available
for test purposes is to be treated as confidential, and hence, not novelty
destroying. Sale of the product in a limited quantity is regarded as sale for test
purposes if the product is normally sold in large quantities.101 In the EPO
approach it seems to be assumed that in testing cases a (explicit or tacit)

96. Id. See also Association Internationale pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle, supra
note 93, Resolution Question 209.
97. Experimental use as discussed in the present section relates to the particular novelty
approach for experiments in the framework of the patent application procedure, and not to
experimental use as a defense in infringement cases.
98. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 113.
99. Id.
100. In addition, European patent law also foresees a special novelty treatment for inventions
displayed at international exhibitions. The European Patent Convention states that a disclosure of the
invention shall not be taken into consideration if it occurred no earlier than six months preceding the
filing of the European patent application and if it was due to the fact that the applicant or his legal
predecessor has displayed the invention at an official, or officially recognized, international exhibition
falling within the terms of the Convention Relating to International Exhibitions, Nov. 22, 1928, 111
L.N.T.S. 343 (last revised Nov. 30, 1972). See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, art.
55(1)(b). This type of nonprejudicial disclosure is not further discussed here.
101. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 221/91 (Dec. 8,
1992); Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 267/91 (Apr. 28, 1993);
Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 782/92 (June 22, 1994). For a
discussion of those cases, see CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, supra note 84, at 61.
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confidentiality agreement existed beforehand.
In medicine
In Europe, the test exemption doctrine is employed quite regularly in the
medical field. An illustrative case concerns the implantation of a correction device
into a patient,102 where the Technical Board of Appeal had to decide on alleged
prior use.103 The Board considered that a device having an investigational status,
being implanted and tested within the restricted area of a hospital, under the
responsibility of a surgeon operating within the framework of an investigator’s
agreement provided with a clause of confidentiality, has to be regarded as a
prototype device. Even without the production of more specific evidence, the
Board was of the opinion that the clinical tests performed on the device under the
conduct and responsibility of a surgeon conferred on the operation as a whole an
implicit obligation of confidentiality which had to be extended to the whole team
involved in that operation. Neither the fact that the device was received and
prepared by hospital staff, nor the fact that it was visible to the hospital staff
during the operation, was suitable to prove that the device was accessible to the
public. The decision was based on the reasoning of a previous Board decision
where prior use was acknowledged but the question of confidentiality was
contested.104 In the latter case it was held that in the medical field there is a prima
facie assumption that any person involved in a medical process is obliged to
maintain confidentiality, given the need for patient confidentiality and the need to
protect the development and testing of prototype devices.
In microbiology
The EPO also addressed the issue of prior testing in the field of
microbiology. The Technical Board of Appeal explained that a reference to
biological material in a scientific publication does not result in that biological
material being considered publicly available.105 The Board also stated that for a
complex biochemical to be made available to the public, the minimum that would
seem to be required for publication was a notice to those in the field that samples

102. European Patent No. 0 468 264 (B1) concerning a spinal column retaining apparatus. See
DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
103. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 906/01 (Sept. 28,
2004).
104. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 152/03 (Apr. 22,
2004) concerning European Patent No. 0 803 230 (B1) relating to an endovascular electrolytically
detachable wire for thrombus formation. See also Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of
Appeal, Case T 158/96; Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 385/07.
These cases may also be interesting in this context, as phase I clinical trials of the medicament in
patients having the disease were not considered to anticipate therapeutic indication.
105. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 576/91 (Oct. 20,
1993), relating to European Patent No. 0 235 308 (B1) concerning a coated foodstuff.
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of the biochemical could be obtained on request, and clear evidence of exactly
what the biochemical was.106
Policy lever
It seems that in Europe, as well as in the U.S., the testing exemption doctrine
is a judicial micro policy lever to accommodate inventions whose design requires
testing. Such a doctrine equally applies to all inventions in all technical fields, but
the effect of such a doctrine will mainly be felt in the pharmaceutical sector, where
a lot of testing is necessary, and in the biotechnology sector when the shift from
bench to bedside is being made.
2.1.7. Inventive step (nonobviousness)—expectation of success
In general
Most patent acts require that an invention is not obvious in view of the state
of the art to enjoy patent protection. U.S. patent law stipulates that a patent may
not be obtained “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which said subject matter pertains” (35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) (2010)).
In the same spirit, European patent law underlines that “an invention shall
be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the
art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art” (Art. 56 EPC). The EPO
Guidelines clarify that the term “obvious” refers to what does not go beyond the
normal progress of technology, but merely follows plainly or logically from the
prior art, i.e., something which does not involve the exercise of any skill or ability
beyond that to be expected of the person skilled in the art.107 Furthermore, the
Technical Boards of Appeal have set forth that a course of action can be
considered “obvious” if the skilled person would have carried it out in expectation
of some improvement or advantage. An illustrative example is the patent
concerning the modification of a layered tablet containing simethicone and
antacid.108 The Board stated that the question regarding the inventive step is not
whether the skilled man could have inserted a barrier between the layers, but
whether he would have done so in expectation of some improvement or
advantage. Since the tablet was, on the face of it and from what was assumed in

106. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 128/92 (Nov.
30,1994), relating to European Patent No. 0 091 539 (B1) concerning active interleukin-2.
107. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. IV, § 11.4 (2010).
108. See European Patent No. 0 014 253 (A1) (filed Dec. 14, 1979) (concerning a simethicone
antacid tablet, refused by Decision of the European Patent Office, Examining Division, July 20,
1982).
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view of its commercialization, a satisfactory answer to the problem of undesirable
migration, the addition of a barrier would have appeared superfluous, wasteful,
and devoid of any technical effect. In view of the recognition that a barrier has a
substantial effect after all, the outcome was not predictable and the claimed
modification involves an inventive step on this basis.109 In another case, it was
held that obviousness is not at hand when the results are clearly predictable and
when there is a reasonable expectation of success.110
In biotechnology
The EPO paid special attention to the expectation of success doctrine in the
field of genetic engineering. The Technical Boards of Appeal pointedly and
repeatedly examined whether it was obvious for the skilled person to try a
suggested approach, route, or method with a reasonable expectation of success.111
An interesting example is the patent relating to the isolation, characterization, and
production of DNA molecules comprising the genes for preprochymosin.112 The
Board considered that the teachings in 1981 on genetic engineering led to the
conclusion that none of the difficulties expected from the prevailing knowledge
on cDNA cloning would be encountered, and that the person skilled in the art
would be fairly confident at the onset of the project that the combination of these
teachings and such standard knowledge on biotechnological protocols from that
time113 would lead to the successful cloning of the genes encoding
preprochymosin and its maturation forms. The Board concluded that it thus
appeared at the date of priority that the cloning and expression of the chymosin
DNA would have been perceived as “an endeavor likely to succeed,” and that
achieving this cloning did not pose such problems as to prove that this
assumption was wrong. On this basis, the Board concluded that the claimed
invention lacked an inventive step.114 This decision is not in contradiction with
other appeal decisions in similar cases of the same time period, which

109. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 2/83 (Mar. 15,
1984), O.J. E.P.O. 265 (1984)
110. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 149/93 (Mar. 23,
1995), relating to European Patent Application No. 0 253 393 (A1), concerning methods for
treatment of sun-damaged human skin with retinoids.
111. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case 60/89 (Aug. 31,
1990), O.J. E.P.O. 268 (1992) relating to European Patent No. 0 006 694 (B1) concerning a method
of making a selected protein. For an overview of similar Board cases, see CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS
OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, at 132–34.
112. See European Patent No. 0 077 109 (B1) (filed Oct. 13, 1982) concerning DNA
molecules comprising the genes for preprochymosin and its maturation forms, and microorganisms
transformed thereby). See also supra Section 2.1.11.
113. See, e.g., SANDY B. PRIMROSE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF GENE MANIPULATIONS 59–88
(1980) and TOM MANIATIS ET AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL § 8 (1982).
114. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 386/94 (Jan. 11,
1996) (Reasons 42 and 59).

Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

11/7/2011 10:16 AM

POLICY LEVERS TAILORING PATENT LAW

463

acknowledged the cloning of other specific cDNA molecules as involving an
inventive step, such as tissue plasminogen activator,115 erythropoietin,116
IFNgamma,117 interleukin-II,118 and human interferon,119 as the actual facts of
these cases were different.
Therefore, in the field of gene technology, inventive step may be
acknowledged if there is no reasonable expectation of success that the cloning and
expression of a given gene can be carried out. Conversely, inventive step cannot
be acknowledged in cases where, at the priority date, a skilled person can expect to
perform the cloning and expression of a gene in a fairly straightforward manner,
and the cloning, although requiring much work, does not pose such problems as
to prove that the expectation of success was ill founded.
Policy lever
The expectation of success doctrine as applied in Europe is a judicial micro
policy lever. The characteristics of this type of obviousness test are not expressly
industry specific, but produce more effect in one industry compared to another.
Young industries, such as biotechnology in its early years, where the level of
uncertainty is high, are more prone to benefit from this approach, compared to
established industries where the level of uncertainty is low(er). Further research is
needed to examine to what extent the expectation of success doctrine as employed
in biotechnology in Europe follows the theory on obviousness and uncertainty, as
pioneered by Robert Merges.120 This theory suggests that where uncertainty is
higher, courts should lower the standard of patentability to compensate for the
risk of failure.
2.1.8. Inventive step (nonobviousness) —secondary indicia—commercial success
In general
In U.S. patent law, Graham vs. John Deere121 and KSR122 define the standard
115. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 923/92 (Nov. 8,
1995).
116. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 412/93 (Nov. 21,
1994).
117. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 223/92 (July 20,
1993).
118. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 128/92 (Nov. 30,
1994).
119. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 223/92 (July 20,
1993), in which it was decided that the expectation of success was not likely by the method known for
interferon-ß.
120. Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L. J. 1, 1–70
(1992).
121. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). See CHISUM, supra note 52,
§§ 5.02 [5], 5.05.
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for assessing nonobviousness, and set forth that secondary indicia can play a role
therein. In European patent law, secondary indicia may equally be employed as
auxiliary considerations in the assessment of inventive step in cases of doubt.
Secondary indicia may encompass factors such as commercial success, the
overcoming of prejudice, the age of the documents cited, the cost of advertising
and the creation of a new market segment, the satisfaction of a long-standing
need, the existence of imitations, and forms of infringement.123 In principle,
commercial success alone is not to be regarded as indicative of inventive step.
Commercial success can only be taken into account if—first—a long felt need has
been demonstrated, and if—second—the commercial success derived from the
technical features of the invention and not from other influences (e.g., selling
techniques or advertising).124
In biotechnology and medicine
There is no specific EPO case law on the application of the secondary indicia
doctrine in the biotech or medical sector. Secondary indicia have not proven to be
particularly relevant in the biotechnology or in the medical industry, except for
one well-known case, namely Viagra. Viagra is the brand name of sildenafil citrate,
a substance vital in the treatment of impotence. When assessing the inventive step
of the Viagra patent,125 the Board confirmed that the establishment of commercial
success as an indicia of inventive step required two steps: “[F]irst, to show that

122. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 5.05. See
also Timo Minssen, The U.S. Examination of Nonobviousness After KSR v. Teleflex with Special Emphasis on
DNA-Related Inventions, 39 INT’L R. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 886, 886–916 (2008)
(discussing the impact of the KSR decision on DNA-related inventions).
123. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 1072/92 (June 28,
1994). The decision relates to European Patent No. 0 291 003 (issued Sept. 12, 1990) concerning a
hollow plug for sealing a heat exchanger tube. The Board concluded that “daß Beweisanzeichen wie
die Befriedigung eines langen bestehenden Bedürfnisses, die Überwindung eines Vorurteils der
Fachwelt oder ein großer wirtschaftlicher Erfolg lediglich Hilfserwägungen für die Beurteilung der
erfinderischen Tätigkeit bilden. Solche Hilfserwägungen können Voraussetzung für eine positive
Beurteilung der erfinderischen Tätigkeit sein, sind dies jedoch nicht zwangsläufig.”
[“[S]igns that demonstrate how to
satisfy
a long existing need,
overcoming a
prejudice of
the professional world or a big commercial success, are only secondary considerations for the
assessment of the inventive step. Such considerations may help achieve a positive assessment
of inventive step, but these are not necessary.”] Id. at 13. See also the famous Epilady case, Decision of
the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 754/89 (Apr. 24, 1991), relating to European
Patent No. 0 101 656 (B1) concerning an electrically powered depilatory device comprising a helical
spring. In this case the Board confirmed that in principle secondary indicia may be relevant to assess
inventive step, but did not rely on secondary indicia in this case as the inventive step could be decided
on the basis of a pure technically skilled assessment.
124. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. IV, § 11.9.4 (2010). See also HANNS ULLRICH, STANDARDS OF
PATENTABILITY FOR EUROPEAN INVENTIONS 84–96 (1978) (in-depth comparative analysis of the
subtest of commercial success between the United States and the European Patent Convention).
125. See European Patent No. 0 702 555 awarded to Pfizer Ltd.
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there has been commercial success and, second, to show that such success results
from the claimed invention and not from one or more other causes.”126 Viagra
had been the subject of various awards and praise in various journals. The Board
stated that the prizes would have been significant if awarded by persons who
understand patent law for the nonobvious nature of the technical contribution to
the art made by the claimed invention. If, however, the prizes were awarded for
the product’s life-enhancing nature, or for the appellants’ high standard of
research, or for a high level of sales, then, for all that any of those reasons might
well be prizeworthy, the prizes can have no significance in the context of inventive
step. The Board arrived at the conclusion that the evidence did not establish that
the “prizes and praises” resulted from the claimed inventive step.127
Policy lever
It is somewhat difficult to derive a conclusion on the basis of this one—
albeit eminent—EPO case in the field of medicine, as to the use of commercial
success as a judicial policy lever. Further research is needed to examine to what
extent commercial success is indeed put to work as a (macro or micro) policy lever in
Europe in the field of biotechnology or medicine.
2.1.9. Industrial applicability (utility)
In general
U.S. patent law states that whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, may obtain a patent
therefore (35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010)). In addition, U.S. courts have traditionally
interpreted the utility requirement to mandate three separate tests: whether the
invention has any purpose other than idle amusement, whether the invention
actually works for its intended purpose, and whether the purpose is one that
society would consider beneficial.128
Under European patent law, an invention shall be considered as susceptible
of industrial application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry, including
agriculture (Art. 57 EPC). According to prevailing EPO case law, the industrial
applicability requirement cannot be equated with the requirement for a “technical”
contribution, and the terms “industrial” and “technical” can not be regarded as
synonyms.129 The notion “technical” is a quintessential feature of an invention, an

126. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 1212/01 (Feb. 3,
2005) (Reason 6.2).
127. See id. (Reasons 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5).
128. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 4.01.
129. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 953/94 (July 15,
1996). The decision related to European Patent No. 0 169 703 concerning a method of functional
analysis. The Board stated that the requirement (defined in Art. 52(2) and (3) of the European Patent
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“invention” being the very first requirement (defined in Art. 52 (2) and (3) EPC)
of claimed subject matter.130 The notion of “industry,” on the other hand, implies
that an activity is carried out continuously, independently, and for financial,
commercial gain.131
In biotechnology
In the U.S., the utility requirement seems to have lost much of its force in
the last several decades.132 The only exceptions to the elimination of the utility
requirement in U.S. patent law can be found in the fields of biology and chemistry.
The PTO’s Utility Examination Guidelines indeed require that the asserted utility
of the subject matter claimed is “specific, substantial, and credible.”133 The threefold “specific-substantial-credible” requirement was ratified by the Federal Circuit
in In re Fisher.134
In Europe, the industrial applicability requirement is very much present in
the field of biotechnology. First and foremost, the EU Biotechnology Directive
explicitly stipulates that the industrial application of a sequence or a partial
sequence of a human gene must be disclosed in the patent application
(Art. 5 (3) Directive; Rule 29 (3) EPC IRs). The recitals and the parliamentary
history indicate that the word “industrial applicability” should be read as
“function,” amounting to the obligation to indicate the function of a partial
Convention, supra note 24) that claimed subject matter be a nonexcluded “invention,” is distinct from
the requirement (defined in Art. 57 of the European Patent Convention) that the claimed invention
be “susceptible of industrial application.” Even though the former requirement may, cum grano salis, be
equated with a requirement for a “technical” contribution, this is not the same as a requirement for an
“industrial” applicability. At least in this context, the terms “technical” and “industrial” are not
synonyms. The Board underlines that “In Article 57 of the European Patent Convention, the meaning
of ‘industrial’ is evidently intended to cover commercial applications; this is made clear, for instance,
by the German version (“gewerblich”). In the context of Article 52(2) of the European Patent
Convention, this is clearly not the case for the meaning of ‘technical.’” Id. at 14–15 (Reason 3.11).
130. Id.
131. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 144/83 (Mar. 27,
1986), O.J. E.P.O. 301 (1986). European Patent Application No. 0 005 636 was refused by the EPO
Examining Division on the ground that, as far as the method relates to a cosmetic process, the subject
matter of the claim was not susceptible for industrial application according to Art. 57 of the European
Patent Convention, supra note 25: the treatment of a human being with naltrexone was considered
essentially biological in nature and therefore the administration of the same could not be regarded as
susceptible to industrial application. The Board took the view that the invention in case complied
with the requirements of Art. 57 of the European Patent Convention, as it was beyond doubt that the
invention can be used by enterprises whose object is to beautify the human or animal body. Such
enterprises in the cosmetic field—such as cosmetic salons and beauty parlors—are part of industry in
the sense of Art. 57 of the European Patent Convention since the notion of concept “industry”
implies that an activity is carried out continuously, independently and for financial gain.
132. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 111.
133. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 2107 Guidelines for Examination of Applications
for Compliance with the Utility Requirement—2100 Patentability, available at http://www.uspto.gov
/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2107.htm (MPEP—Latest Revision July 2010).
134. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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sequence of a gene.135 Furthermore, recent EPO case law emphasized that a
“practical” application of the invention has to be disclosed. A typical case is the
patent related to the production of the protein Tyrosine Phosphatase PTP20.136
The Board underlined that merely because a substance—in casu a polypeptide—
can be produced in some way does not necessarily mean that the industrial
applicability requirement is fulfilled, unless there is also some profitable use for
which the substance can be employed.137 Biotechnological inventions are quite
often concerned with substances found in nature (e.g., a protein, a DNA sequence,
etc.). In cases where the structure and function of the substance is elucidated and
means are provided for extracting it or producing it in large amounts, industrial
applicability exists in relation to the possibility to exploit the information and
technical means disclosed in order to manufacture the substance and use it for
some function related to its natural one, or for some other previously unknown
(now disclosed) function, or as a starting material for making useful analogs or
derivatives with some improved features. If a function is well known to be
essential for human health, then the identification of the substance having this
function will immediately suggest a practical application in the case of a disease or
condition caused by a deficiency, as was the case, for example, for insulin, human
growth hormone, or erythropoietin. In such cases an adequate description will
ensure, in accordance with the requirements of Art. 57 EPC, that the invention
can be made or used in industry.138 In cases where a substance naturally occurring
in the human body is identified, and possibly also structurally characterized and
made available through some method, but either its function is not known or it is

135. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. IV, § 5.4 (2010). Particularly relevant are Recitals 22, 23 and 24 of
the EU Biotechnology Directive, which run as follows:
(22) Whereas the discussion on the patentability of sequences or partial
sequences of genes is controversial; whereas, according to this Directive, the
granting of a patent for inventions which concern such sequences or partial
sequences should be subject to the same criteria of patentability as in all other
areas of technology: novelty, inventive step and industrial application; whereas
the industrial application of a sequence or partial sequence must be disclosed in
the patent application as filed; (23) Whereas a mere DNA sequence without
indication of a function does not contain any technical information and is
therefore not a patentable invention; (24) Whereas, in order to comply with the
industrial application criterion it is necessary in cases where a sequence or
partial sequence of a gene is used to produce a protein or part of a protein, to
specify which protein or part of a protein is produced or what function it
performs.
Id. (emphasis added).
136. See European Patent Application No. 0 914 452 (A2) (filed Dec. 12, 1997) concerning
novel PTP20, PCP-2, BDP1, CLK and SIRP proteins and related products and methods.
137. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 870/04 (May 11,
2005) (Reason 4) (unpublished), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf
/t040870eu1.pdf.
138. Id. at Reason 5.
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complex and incompletely understood, and no disease or condition has yet been
identified as being attributable to an excess or deficiency of the substance, and no
other practical use is suggested for the substance, then industrial applicability
cannot be acknowledged. There must be a borderline between what can be
accepted, and what can only be categorized as an interesting research result which
per se does not yet allow a practical industrial application to be identified. Even
though research results may be a scientific achievement of considerable merit, they
are not necessarily an invention which can be applied industrially.139 A vague and
speculative indication of possible objectives that might or might not be achievable
by carrying out further research with the tool as described is not sufficient for
fulfillment of the requirement of industrial applicability. The purpose of granting a
patent is not to reserve an unexplored field of research for an applicant.140
In one of the very first national court decisions on industrial applicability for
biotechnological inventions, the U.K. Court of Appeal invalidated a patent for
lack of industrial application,141 despite a ruling of the EPO Board that the same
patent was valid.142 The case demonstrates the danger of allowing patents “too far
upstream.” Justice Jacob contended that however clever and inventive discovering
a gene sequence may have been, one cannot have a patent for it or for the protein
for which it encodes if the patent does not disclose how it can be used.143
Furthermore, “it is difficult to see why the mere fact of the T-cell activity of
Neutrokine- may represent a valid basis for a possible industrial application.”144
Policy lever
In European patent law, the industrial applicability requirement constitutes
both a macro and a micro policy lever in biotechnology. First and foremost, the
industrial applicability requirement makes for a statutory macro policy lever. By
expressly demanding the “function” of (partial sequences of) genes, European
patent law establishes a specific standard for inventions in the biotechnological
field. Second, the industrial applicability requirement also constitutes a judicial micro
policy lever particularly relevant in the context of biotechnology. By repeatedly
underlining that the notion of “industry” implies that an activity is carried out
139. Id. at Reason 6.
140. Id. at Reason 21.
141. Eli Lilly and Company v. Human Genome Sciences Inc., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 33 (Eng.).
142. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 18/09 (Oct. 21,
2009) relating to European Patent No. 0 939 804, which concerned a Neutrokine- polypeptide,
awarded to Ely Lilly. Claim 1 as granted reads as follows: “1. A nucleic acid molecule comprising a
polynucleotide sequence encoding a Neutrokine- polypeptide wherein said polynucleotide sequence
is selected from the group consisting of: (a) a polynucleotide sequence encoding the full length
Neutrokine- polypeptide having the amino sequence or residues 1 to 285 of SEQ ID NO:2; (b) a
polynucleotide sequence encoding the extracellular domain of the Neutrokine- polypeptide having
the amino acid sequence of residues 73 tot 285 of SEQ ID NO: 2; (c) . . . (d) . . . (e) . . . (f) . . . .”
143. Eli Lilly, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 33 at Reason 57.
144. Id. at Reason 155.

Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

11/7/2011 10:16 AM

POLICY LEVERS TAILORING PATENT LAW

469

continuously, independently, and for financial, commercial gain, the European
industrial applicability requirement, being nominally neutral vis-à-vis specific
industry sectors, favors technologies and/or industries which develop inventions
which are more downstream and closer to the market. Applying the prevailing
“industry” interpretation rigorously within the biotechnology industry, might
ultimately lead to a patent scenario where precedence is given to end products
with a definite commercial value over research tools. Such an approach definitely
has positive effects, as products and processes which are useful for research are
not appropriable by patents and will, in principle, be available for use to all.
However, such an approach might also have negative effects, as research tools in
the absence of patent protection are denied the patent incentive, possibly resulting
in lesser innovation.
2.1.10. Skilled person
The role of the skilled person
In U.S. patent law, the “person having ordinary skill in the art” (PHOSITA)
plays a pivotal role in deciding on a series of factual questions, which are measured
from his or her perspective. First and foremost, the PHOSITA plays an important
role in the assessment of obviousness:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.145
In other words, an invention may not have been obvious to a person with
ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter of the invention pertains at the
time of the invention and in the light of the teachings of the prior art.146 The
PHOSITA also comes to the fore to assess the adequacy of the patent disclosure:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.147

145.
146.
147.

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2010).
CHISUM, supra note 52, §§ 5.01, 5.03 [4].
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010).
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Last but not least, the PHOSITA is also central in defining the patent scope.
The patent claims are being assessed with regard to the knowledge of a person
having skill in the art.
In European patent law, the “person skilled in the art” (PSITA) also plays a
key role. First, the PSITA is of importance in the framework of the inventive step
assessment: “An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if,
having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the
art.” (Art. 56 EPC). The PSITA also plays a vital role in the context of the patent
disclosure: “The European patent application shall disclose the invention in a
manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled
in the art.” (Art. 83 EPC). Sanctions for inadequate disclosure are fierce, ranging
from opposition148 to revocation.149 Last but not least, the PSITA also shows up
in the framework of claim interpretation and patent scope. The EPC is not very
explicit about the role of the PSITA in this regard,150 but all the more so are the
national courts of the member states, where quite often reference is made to how
the PSITA would understand the terms in patent claims. Exemplary in this regard
is the enunciation of the honorable Lord Hoffman, who stated that “The question
is always what the person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to
be using the language of the claim to mean.”151

148. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Art. 100(b) (stating that opposition may
only be filed on the grounds that “the European patent does not disclose the invention in a manner
sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.”).
149. See id.,, Art. 138(1)(b) (setting forth that a European patent may be revoked with effect
for a Contracting State only on the grounds that “the European patent does not disclose the
invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the
art.”).
150. Id., Art. 69 (1) (stipulating that “[t]he extent of the protection conferred by a European
patent or a European patent application shall be determined by the claims.”). Article 1 Protocol on
the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC of Oct. 5, 1973 as revised by the Act revising the EPC of Nov.
29, 2000 adds that
Article 69 should not be interpreted as meaning that the extent of the
protection conferred by a European patent is to be understood as that defined
by the strict, literal meaning of the wording used in the claims, the description
and drawings being employed only for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity
found in the claims. Nor should it be taken to mean that the claims serve only
as a guideline and that the actual protection conferred may extend to what,
from a consideration of the description and drawings by a person skilled in the
art, the patent proprietor has contemplated. On the contrary, it is to be
interpreted as defining a position between these extremes which combines a
fair protection for the patent proprietor with a reasonable degree of legal
certainty for third parties.
151. Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Ltd., (2004) U.K.H.L. 46 34 (appeal taken
from E.W.C.A. (Civ)).

Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

POLICY LEVERS TAILORING PATENT LAW

11/7/2011 10:16 AM

471

The profile of the skilled person
In general
Having elucidated the role of the skilled person, who exactly is he or she? In
EPO case law the profile of the skilled person has been extensively debated. For
the purpose of the inventive step assessment, the PSITA should be presumed to
be an ordinary practitioner aware of what was common general knowledge in the
art at the relevant date, and who does not possess any inventive capability.
Nevertheless, the PSITA is expected to look for suggestions in neighboring fields
if the same or similar problems arise in these fields. If the problem prompts the
PSITA to seek its solution in another technical field, the specialist in that field is
the person qualified to solve the problem and the assessment of whether the
solution involves an inventive step will have to be based on that specialist’s
knowledge and ability. An interesting example relates to the assessment of
inventive step of a cleaning apparatus for an endless conveyor belt, where the
solution to the problem consists in discovering a rod-shaped elastic element which
is less prone to breakage. Reference to the knowledge and capabilities of a
materials specialist, rather than a conveying equipment specialist, will have to be
made.152 In advanced technical fields the PSITA could be a team of two or more
experts from the relevant technical branches. For example, for the assessment of
an invention relating to an ion-generating plasma apparatus, the semiconductor
expert would team up with a plasma specialist.153 Or in the field of advanced laser

152. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 32/81 (Mar. 5, 1982)
O.J. E.P.O. 225 (1982). This decision related to European Patent Application No. 0 004 809,
concerning a cleaning apparatus for an endless conveyor belt. The application was refused by decision
of the Examining Division arguing that by reference to the general knowledge of any technically
skilled person the invention was certainly new but did not involve an inventive step. The Board
argued that the problem to be solved consisted in discovering a rod-shaped elastic element which is
less prone to breakage, which problem undeniably confronts the conveying equipment specialist;
however, it prompts him at the same time to seek its solution in the field of material science.
Consequently, the skilled person qualified to solve the problem cannot be a conveying equipment
specialist, but has to be a materials specialist alone. Therefore, the assessment of whether the
problem’s solution involves an inventive step must be made by reference to the knowledge and ability
of a materials specialist, not a conveying equipment specialist. Id. at 227 (Reason 4.2). See also § 7.1.1
of CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, at
61.
153. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 424/90 (Dec. 11,
1991), relating to European Patent No. 0 084 970 concerning a magnetically enhanced plasma process
and apparatus at Reason 1.3 (holding that the claimed apparatus is no doubt intended to be used in
the reactive ion etching but not accepting that the competent skilled person is merely a
semiconductor specialist). The Board considered that in real life, a semiconductor specialist would
consult a plasma specialist, if his problem concerns providing a technical improvement of an ion
generating plasma apparatus and the semiconductor specialist would be expected to form a team with
the plasma specialist. In the Board’s view, it is appropriate to follow Decision T 32/81, and to base
the assessment of whether the claimed solution involves an inventive step on the knowledge and
abilities of the specialist in that technical field in which the objective problem prompts the person
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technology, the PSITA would be seen as a production team of three experts, one
in physics, one in electronics and one in chemistry.154
For the purpose of disclosure, the PSITA should make use of his common
general knowledge.155 Textbooks and general technical literature form part of the
common general knowledge,156 whereas information which can only be obtained
after a comprehensive search is not to be regarded as part of the common general
knowledge.157 The PSITA should not employ any inventive effort over and above
his ordinary skills.158 In new fields of research, where relevant technical knowledge
is not yet available from textbooks, patent specifications and scientific publications
may be considered to form part of the common general knowledge.159

skilled in the art to seek its solution.
154. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 222/86 (Sept. 22,
1987), relating to European Patent No. 0 008 513 concerning a method and system to depict a picture
of an object, such invention belonging to the technical field of laser engraving at Reason 4.2 (holding
that laser engraving represents an advanced technology, where it is appropriate to identify the skilled
person to be a production team of the following three experts: a physicist, who is competent for the
laser, an expert in electronics, who is competent for the scanning and modulation, and a chemist, who
is competent for the photosensitive layer of the recording carrier. The Board further underlines that
the person qualified to solve a problem is regarded to be the specialist of the particular technical field,
in which the particular problem prompts a skilled person to seek its solution, referring to Decision
T 32/81).
155. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 206/83 (Mar. 26,
1986) O.J. E.P.O. 5 (1987), relating to European Patent No. 0 001 473 concerning herbicidal
halogenomethyl-pyridyloxy-phenoxy-alkanecarboxylic acids and derivatives, and processes of
controlling unwanted plants therewith at Reason 5 (stating that the person skilled in the art is
expected to have common general knowledge at his immediate disposal and that it would be unfair if
more were to be expected of him, i.e. an awareness of the whole state of the art).
156. See id. at Reason 5 (holding that it is normally accepted that common general knowledge
is represented by basic handbooks and textbooks on the subject in question. The skilled person could
well be expected to consult these to obtain clear advice as to what to do in the circumstances, since
the skills of such persons not only include knowledge about particular basic prior art but also
knowledge as to where to find such information. Such books may indeed refer him to articles
describing specifically how to act or at least giving a fairly generally applicable method for the
purpose, which can be used without any doubt). See also Decision of the European Patent Office,
Board of Appeal, Case T 171/84 (Oct. 24, 1985) relating to European Patent No. 0 003 870
concerning polymer resin emulsions (holding that the document referred to by the appellant as closest
prior art was neither cited in the patent specification in support of the disclosure, nor had it become
part of common general knowledge, for example, through appreciation in a standard textbook).
157. See id. at Reason 6 (holding that the indexes of Chemical Abstracts cover virtually the
whole state of the art, and represent therefore much more than what is assumed to be the common
general knowledge. Reliance on the contents of Chemical Abstracts to rectify insufficiency might be
tantamount to leaving the skilled reader to carry out a search in the whole state of the art, which
would be an unacceptable burden).
158. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 10/86 (Sept. 1,
1988), relating to European Patent No. 0 049 816 and concerning a process for obtaining energy from
the mass-energy equivalence at the formation of protons and neutrons.
159. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Technical Board of Appeal, Case T 51/87
(Dec. 8, 1988), 1991 O.J. E.P.O. (C3) 177, relating to European Patent No. 0 002 615, concerning 13Halo and 13-deoxy derivatives of modified milbemycin compounds and their preparation. By contrast
to previous decisions (see T 206/83, “Herbicides,” supra note 155, and T 171/84, “Redox Catalyst,”
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Finally, for the purpose of claim interpretation, the PSITA is expected to rule
out interpretations which are illogical or which do not make technical sense. He or
she should try, with synthetical propensity, i.e., building up rather than tearing
down, to arrive at an interpretation of the claim which is technically sensible and
takes into account the whole disclosure of the patent (Art. 69 EPC), and he or she
should construe the patent by a mind willing to understand, not a mind desirous
of misunderstanding.160
In biotechnology
EPO jurisprudence has given special consideration to the PSITA in the field
of biotechnology.161 The Technical Boards of Appeal have confirmed prevailing
case law on the notion of “common general knowledge” and stated that common
general knowledge can be considered the information contained in basic
handbooks, monographs, and textbooks on the subject in question.162
Furthermore, the Boards have argued that the PSITA in biotechnology is
OJ EPO 1986, 95), where the Board held that patent specifications were not normally part of the
common general knowledge of the natural skilled addressee, the Board argued in the present case that
the starting compounds at stake (highly elaborated microbial metabolites) opened a brand new field of
research, so that any technical knowledge acquired in this field at the beginning, through basic
pioneering work had not yet been distilled into the form of textbooks. In prior decisions, the situation
was quite different, as the PSITA was a person working in the field of classical herbicide chemistry,
which was not a new developing field like that of the chemistry of C-076 compounds here. The
PSITA, therefore, could not be presumed to possess the same common general knowledge in both
cases. See id.
160. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 190/99 (Mar. 6,
2001) relating to European Patent No. 0 448 265 concerning a woven slide fastener stringer, at
Reason 2.4. See also CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
supra note 84, at 205.
161. An interesting measure for comparison may be found in E. Richard Gold & Karen
Lynne Durell, Innovating the Skilled Reader: Tailoring Patent Law to New Technologies, 19 WASH. & LEE
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 189, 189–226 (2005), where the skilled reader has been analyzed in Canadian case
law in an attempt to prove that “one size does not fit all.”
162. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 890/02 (Oct. 14,
2004) O.J. E.P.O. 497 (2005) (relating to European Patent Application No. 96 920 888.3 and
concerning DNA sequences of a gene of hydroxy-phenyl pyruvate dioxygenase and production of
plants containing a gene of hydroxy-phenyl pyruvate dioxygenase, such plants being tolerant to
certain herbicides, submitted by Bayer CropScience). The Board held that whilst not being stricto
sensu encyclopaedias or handbooks, the ENZYME and the EMBL databases nonetheless answer to
the definition of, respectively, an encyclopaedia or a handbook. Furthermore, they fulfill the three
criteria set out in the case law when defining the common general knowledge, namely (a) they are
known by the skilled person to be an appropriate source for obtaining the desired information, (b)
looking for this information requires no undue effort, since no search strategy is needed but only the
EC number or the enzyme name (in the present case the enzyme name is known from document D10
itself), and (c) the information retrieved (for example, the nucleotide sequence) does not need any
further research work, i.e. it is unambiguous and straightforward. For these reasons, in the Board’s
judgment, the information in these databases ENZYME and EMBL meets the definition of common
general knowledge given in the case law (Reason 9). See also European Patent Convention, supra note
24, Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. II, § 4.1 (2010) and the cases
cited there.
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considered to be conservative. He or she would never go against an established
prejudice, nor try to enter unpredictable areas, nor take incalculable risks. The
PSITA would perform a transfer of technology from a neighboring field to his or
her specific field of interest, only if this transfer involved routine experimental
work comprising only routine trials.163 The PSITA would not engage in creative
thinking: the Nobel Prize laureate’s level of skill does not determine the PSITA,
nor does it determine what must be considered as falling within common general
knowledge of the time.164
An illustrative example of the profile of the PSITA in biotechnology is the
inventive step assessment applied to the identification, characterization, and
production of human immune interferon. In this case the Board had to consider
the knowledge and capabilities of the PSITA in the field of genetic engineering
around October 1981.165 By this time, a considerably greater number of genes had
been made the subject of cloning and expressing methods, and skills and
experience in this technical field were developing rapidly. The PSITA had to be
assumed to lack the inventive imagination to solve problems for which routine
methods of solution did not already exist. The knowledge of the PSITA had to be

163. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 455/91 (June 20,
1994) O.J. E.P.O. 684 relating to European Patent No. 0 060 057 concerning the expression of
polypeptides in yeast. In the Board’s view, the conservative attitude must not be seen in the sense of
being reluctant or opposed to modify or adjust a known product or process, but rather in the sense of
being cautious. For example, the skilled person in question would neither go against an established
prejudice nor try to enter into “sacrosanct” or unpredictable areas nor take incalculable risks.
However, within the normal design procedures, the said expert would readily seek appropriate,
manifest changes, modifications or adjustments which involve little trouble or work and no risks or
only calculable risks, especially for the sake of obtaining a more handy or convenient product or
simplifying a procedure. In particular, the skilled person working in one field (see, e.g., expression in
yeast) would regard a means conveniently adopted in a neighboring field (see, e.g., the bacterial art) as
being readily usable also in that field, if this transfer of technical knowledge involves nothing out of
the ordinary.” See id. at Reason 5.1.3.3.
164. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 60/89, supra note 111,
O.J. E.P.O. at 268 (1992) (relating to European Patent No. 0 006 694, Reason 2.2.4) (holding that the
skill of the PSITA in the field of genetic engineering in 1978 is not to be defined as a Nobel Prize
laureate, even if a number of scientists working in this field at that time were actually awarded the
Nobel Prize. Rather, it is understood that the skilled person was to be seen as a graduate scientist or a
team of scientists of that skill, working in laboratories which moved from molecular genetics to
genetic engineering techniques, at that time). See also Decision of the European Patent Office, Board
of Appeal, Case T 500/91 (Oct. 21, 1992), relating to European Patent No. 0 032 134 (concerning
DNA sequences, recombinant DNA molecules, and processes for producing human interferon--like
polypeptides), Reason 2.2 (holding that in accordance with the notion skilled person who may be
represented by a team of appropriate specialists, the PSITA is oriented toward practicalities and the
art does not involve performing scientific research in areas not yet explored).
165. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 223/92 (July 20,
1993) (relating to European Patent No. 0 077 670 concerning human immune (γ) interferon (IFN-γ)
awarded to Genentech on June 28, 1989; Appeal against the Decision of the EPO Opposition
Division from Jan. 13, 1992 rejecting the opposition filed against European Patent No. 0 006 694.
This is more than one year later than in Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal,
Case T 500/91, supra note 164.
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considered as that of a team of appropriate specialists who knew all the difficulties
still to be expected when considering the cloning of a new gene. Similarly, in the
case of the production of erythropoietin, it was agreed that the PSITA could be
treated as “a team of three composed of one Ph.D. researcher with several years
experience in the aspect of gene technology or biochemistry under consideration,
assisted by two laboratory technicians fully acquainted with the known techniques
relevant to that aspect.”166
EPO jurisprudence also clarified that the same level of skill has to be applied
when, for the same invention, the question of inventive step (Art. 56 EPC) and
sufficient disclosure (Art. 83 EPC) have to be considered.167 Although the same
level of skill is applied for both questions, the two starting points differ: for
inventive step purposes, the skilled man knows only the prior art, whereas for
sufficiency of disclosure, he knows the prior art and the disclosed invention.168
Policy lever
In Europe, the PSITA was formally called into life by the legislature and was
mainly fleshed out by EPO case law: the definition of the role of the PSITA is
mainly statutory, whereas the description of the exact profile of the PSITA is
mainly judicial. Comparing the profile of the PSITA in general and in the domain
of biotechnology does not seem to reveal different standards. Rather than
variations between industry sectors, other differences come to the fore. First, a

166. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 412/93, supra note
116, relating to European Patent No. 0 148 605 concerning the production of recombinant
erythropoietin and awarded to Kirin Amgen on July 25, 1990. The parties agreed that for this case the
skilled person should be treated as a team of three composed of one Ph.D. researcher with several
years experience in the aspect of gene technology or biochemistry under consideration, assisted by
two laboratory technicians fully acquainted with the known techniques relevant to that aspect. This
definition of the skilled person coincides with the view of the Board, and references in this decision
to “skilled person” are to be interpreted as such. In Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of
Appeal, T 223/92, supra note 165 at Reason 5.5, where the priority claimed was for much the same
time—1983, as in this case—the Board considering that case defined the “skilled person” as a highly
skilled technician, which in real terms would mean a Ph.D. researcher. The notional skilled person in
terms of patent law can then be treated as comprising this researcher and two laboratory assistants
having the necessary manual dexterity and lack of fatigue. See id. at Reason 4.
167. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 60/89, supra note 111
at 268. The case relates to European Patent No. 0 006 694 awarded to Harvard College concerning a
method of making a selected protein by inserting DNA, and invented by Walter Gilbert, Reason 3.2.5
(adopting the view that the same level of skill has to be applied when, for the same invention, the two
questions of sufficient disclosure and inventive step have to be considered.
168. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 694/92 (May 8,
1996) O.J. E.P.O. 408 (1997), relating to European Patent No. 0 122 791 concerning plant gene
expression and awarded to Mycogen Plant Science. Parting from previous case law (see, e.g., Decision
of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 60/89, supra note 111), the Board underlined
that “whereas for the purpose of evaluating inventive step the skilled person has knowledge of the
prior art only, for the purpose of evaluating sufficiency of disclosure (and, hence, support) he or she
has knowledge of the prior art and of the invention as disclosed.”
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distinction between “old” and “new” fields of research can be disentangled. In
“old” conventional technical areas the standard of the PSITA seems to be lower
than the level of the PSITA in “new” technological fields. In conventional fields
common general knowledge is formed by textbooks, whereas in new fields,
common general knowledge encompasses patent specifications and scientific
publications as well. Furthermore, a distinction between “low” and “advanced”
technologies can be observed. In “low” technologies, the PSITA measuring
certain factual questions can be a single skilled person. In advanced and more
complex fields of research, the PSITA is not necessarily one skilled person, but
can be held to be a team of skilled persons. Since the biotechnological field is both
“new” and pretty “advanced,” the level of the PSITA can differ from other
sectors, leading to the conclusion that the PSITA can, indirectly, be seen as a judicial
micro policy lever. So, we tend to disagree with Burk and Lemley, who claim that
the use of the PHOSITA is a judicial macro policy lever because it explicitly creates
different standards for different technologies and different industries, thus
creating the most fundamental policy lever, because it makes so much turn on the
knowledge of scientists in any given field.169
2.1.11. Enabling disclosure
In general
In the U.S., the UPA prescribes that the specification shall contain a written
description of the invention (written description requirement) in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use
the same (enablement requirement), and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention (best mode
requirement) (35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010)). The modern purpose of the written
description requirement is to provide evidence that the patent applicant has
conceptual possession of the invention.170
In Europe, the EPC equally prescribes that a European patent application
shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete (written
description) for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art (enablement), but
the EPC does not require best mode (Art. 83 EPC). EPO case law clarifies that
sufficiency of disclosure must be assessed on the basis of the application as a
whole, including the description and claims171 and not of the claims alone. EPO
169. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 116.
170. Id. at 118. See also CHISUM, supra note 52, at 751.
171. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 14/83 (June 7,
1983), O.J. E.P.O. 105 (1984) relating to European Patent Application No. 0 004 795, concerning a
method for producing a vinyl chloride resin. The Board took the view that the “question whether an
invention has been disclosed sufficiently clearly and completely is not to be decided solely on the
basis of the content of the claims. If a chemical invention involves the task of manufacturing a
product with certain measurable properties (e.g., gel content or degree of polymerisation of a
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jurisprudence has further added that whether the invention is indeed disclosed
sufficiently in accordance with Art. 83 EPC will be assessed through the eyes of
PSITA’s common general knowledge at the relevant date.172 EPO case law also
underlined that the disclosure should be reproducible without undue burden, apart
from unexplored fields, where a reasonable amount of trial and error is
permissible.173 Last but not least, it is required that an invention shall describe in
detail at least one way of carrying out the invention claimed, using examples where
appropriate (Rule 42 (1) (e) EPC IRs).
In biotechnology
In the U.S., the written description requirement has been enforced quite
stringently in biotechnology. In various cases where human DNA sequences were
claimed, U.S. courts repeatedly underlined that the written description
requirement is not adequately met when the actual DNA sequence is not fully
disclosed and that a full description of the DNA itself is required.174 Recently,
guidelines have formally implemented this viewpoint.
In Europe, the written description requirement has also been applied quite
rigorously. According to EPO policy and case law, DNA sequences were to be
copolymer), and this task is performed by means of a process involving several variables, then the
means of its performance are to be regarded as sufficiently disclosed within the meaning of
Art. 83 EPC if, encountering occasional lack of success notwithstanding strict adherence to the
prescribed limits of those variables, clear information, contained in the description, regarding the
effects of individual variables on the properties of the product enables the person skilled in the art to
bring about the desired properties quickly and reliably in such an event.” Id. at 105–06.
172. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 322/93 (Apr. 2,
1997) (relating to European Patent Application No. 0 250 766 concerning microemulsions containing
perfluoropolyethers), Reason 3.1 confirming that literally fulfilling the statutory requirements “does
not automatically mean that the application as filed contains sufficient information to allow a person
skilled in the art, using his common general knowledge, to carry out the invention without undue
burden within substantially the whole area that is claimed. That has to be decided by appraising the
information contained in the examples as well as the other parts of the description in the light of the
skilled person’s common general knowledge at the relevant date.”
173. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 226/85 336 (Mar.
17, 1987) (relating to European Patent No. 0 009 942 and concerning a pourable scouring cleanser
composition), Reason 8 (stating that even though “a reasonable amount of trial and error is
permissible when it comes to the sufficiency of disclosure in an unexplored field or—as it is in this
case—where there are many technical difficulties, there must then be available adequate instructions
in the specification or on the basis of common general knowledge which would lead the skilled
person necessarily and directly towards success through the evaluation of initial failures or through an
acceptable statistical expectation rate in case of random experiments.”). See also id. at 336–37, 340 (“In
the present appeal the sensitivity or inherent instability of the composition, or other unexplained
circumstances are such that the skilled person can only reproduce the invention in a number of
instances with some luck, if at all, in view of the unknown character of reasons which cause failure.
For this reason, the patent is invalid in its entirety for not complying with the requirements of
Article 83 [of the European Patent Convention].”); CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84.
174. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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fully represented. Rule 30 EPC IRs now formally requires that if nucleotide or
amino acid sequences are disclosed in the European patent application, the
description shall contain a sequence listing conforming to the rules laid down by
the President of the EPO for the standardized representation of nucleotide and
amino acid sequences.175
EPO case law on enablement has been focusing a lot on the one-way-rule.
An illustrative example is the invention relating to the expression of
preprochymosin.176 The patent specification provided a technically detailed
example for the expression of preprochymosin and its maturation forms in E. coli.
Although the parties agreed that sufficient information was given to reproduce the
invention in E. coli, it was debated whether sufficiency of disclosure was achieved
with respect to a process for expression in microorganisms in general.177 The
patentee claimed that expression in microorganisms was definitely intended and
that the references to expression sufficed to establish enablement, as the state of
the art provided examples of foreign gene expression in eucaryots (such as yeasts)
and procaryots; chymosin being an eucaryotic gene should be more likely to
express in eucaryots than in E. coli.178 The Board believed that one way to carry
out the invention was clearly indicated, that there existed no serious doubts that
the invention could eventually be carried out with microorganisms other than E.
coli,179 and decided that the invention was sufficiently disclosed.
Another interesting case is the patent related to the production of
recombinant interferon. The invention provided a route, through recombinant
DNA technology, to certain types of interferons but in a manner that would not
provide identical results each time when repeated. It was the view of the Board
that variations in the construction within a class of genetic precursors, such as
recombinant DNA molecules claimed by a combination of structural limitations
and functional tests, are immaterial to the sufficiency of the disclosure provided
that the skilled person could reliably obtain some members of the class without
necessarily knowing in advance which member would thereby be made available.
So, an invention may also be sufficiently disclosed where results are not exactly

175. Rule 30 of the European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Implementing Regulations
has been introduced as a result from the decision of the President of the EPO and the Notice from
the EPO, 2007 O.J. E.P.O. (special ed. 3) (C.1–C.2) 29. It has been suggested that the requirement of
the sequence listing is associated with the need to facilitate searching by the EPO rather than the
“completeness” of the description. If such a list is not provided within a period of two months, the
application shall be refused. See Rule 30 (3) of the European Patent Convention, supra note 24,
Implementing Regulations.
176. See European Patent Application No. 0 077 109 (concerning DNA molecules comprising
the genes for preprochymosin and its maturation forms, and microorganisms transformed thereby).
177. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 386/94 (Jan. 11,
1996), O.J. E.P.O. 658 (1996), Reason 8.
178. Id. at 666–67, Reason 9.
179. Id. at 668, Reason 14.
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repeatable.180
Yet another prominent case is the invention relating to a method for
producing transgenic animals, resulting in the famous Harvard-oncomouse
patent.181 The claimed invention was defined by the incorporation of an activated
oncogene sequence into the genome of nonhuman mammalian animals.182 The
Examining Division took the view that the claimed invention referred to all
nonhuman mammalian animals, whereas the invention described in the examples
had been performed only on mice. Not convinced that a skilled person would be
able to carry out the invention successfully on all other kinds of nonhuman
mammals as it had been performed on mice, the Examining Division refused the
application, inter alia, on the ground that the claims were unrealistically broad.183
However, the Board argued that the mere fact that a claim is broad is not in itself
a ground for considering the application as not complying with the requirement
for sufficient disclosure. Only if there are serious doubts, substantiated by
verifiable facts, may an application be objected to for lack of sufficient
disclosure.184
Policy lever
It seems that the enabling disclosure standard is relatively high in
biotechnology, especially in the area of DNA sequences. Initiated by EPO case
law, the current enabling disclosure standard for DNA sequences is now formally
embedded in the EPC. Thus the enabling disclosure requirement turned from a
judicial into a statutory macro policy lever.
Burk and Lemley quite understandably expect that a more stringent written
description requirement results in DNA patents with a narrower scope—in other

180. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 301/87 335 (Feb.
16, 1989). See also Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 636/97 (Mar. 26,
1998), Reason 4.5 (relating to European Patent No. 0 148 605 concerning the production of
erythropoietin and awarded to Kirin Amgen: “For the board it is a fundamental principle of patent
law that a claim can validly cover broad subject matter, even though the description of the relevant
patent does not enable every method of arriving at that subject matter to be carried out. Otherwise no
dominant patent could exist, and each developer of a new method of arriving at that subject matter
would be free of earlier patents. In many cases in the field of biotechnology, patent protection would
then become illusory. This is not to say that some claims might not be too broad in scope and not be
enabled over their whole scope for the purpose of Article 83 EPC but this was not considered to be
the case in respect of Claim 1 by this Board in T 412/93 on the evidence before the board and this is
res judicata.”).
181. See European Patent No. 0 169 762 (B1) (filed June 6, 1985 and granted May 13, 1992).
182. See id. at Claim 19 (claiming “A transgenic non-human mammalian animal whose germ
cells and somatic cells contain an activated oncogene sequence as a result of chromosomal
incorporation into the animal genome, or into the genome of an ancestor of said animal, said
oncogene optionally being further defined according to any one of the claims 3 to 10.”).
183. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 19/90 (Oct. 3,
1990), O.J. E.P.O. 476 (1990), Reason 3.2.
184. Id. at 483 (Reason 3.3).
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words, that the effect of a stringent written description requirement is narrower
scope.185 However, scrutinous analysis of a large set of human DNA claims
proved that this is not always the case, and that many broad and unclear DNA
patents have been awarded.186
2.2. Patent Scope
Now that the policy levers affecting patent acquisition have been screened,
we turn to policy levers dealing with patent scope. The policy levers affecting
scope of protection and rights of the patentee are being treated separately. Indeed,
European case law has introduced a clear distinction between the protection and the
rights which are conferred by a patent. The protection conferred by a patent is
determined by the terms of the claims (Art. 69 (1) EPC), and in particular by the
categories of such claims and their technical features. In this connection,
Art. 69 EPC and its Protocol are to be applied, both in proceedings before the
EPO and in proceedings within the Contracting States, whenever it is necessary to
determine the protection which is conferred. In contrast, the rights conferred on
the proprietor of a European patent (Art. 64 (1) EPC) are the legal rights which
the law of a designated Contracting State may confer upon the proprietor, for
example, regarding the acts of third parties that constitute infringement of the
patent, and the remedies which are available for any infringement.187
2.2.1. Scope of product claims—absolute vs. limited scope
In general
U.S. patent law is conceived as a patent system providing absolute product
protection.188 European patent law equally provides full product protection. EPO
case law has pointedly expounded that the protection conferred by a product
claim to a physical entity, such as a compound per se, confers absolute protection
upon such physical entity, that is, “wherever it exists and whatever its context (and
therefore for all uses of such physical entity, whether known or unknown).”189

185. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 122 (“Application of the enablement requirement
through the intermediary of the PHOSITA has the same narrowing effect. In certain industries, such
as software, the enablement requirement is easily satisfied and therefore plays virtually no role in
limiting the scope of claims. In other industries, such as biotechnology, the doctrine has been applied
with much more vigor.”).
186. See Huys, supra note 50. For a discussion, see infra Parts 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.
187. Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 02/88 (Dec.
11, 1989), O.J. E.P.O. 93 (2009) (Reason 3.3).
188. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 18. See also ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 388 (4th ed. 2007)
189. Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, G 02/88, supra note
187, at 93.
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In biotechnology
From the early ages of biotechnology onwards, the EPO took the view that
the absolute product protection regime would equally apply to biotechnological
inventions. This approach was laid down and further elaborated in the EU
Biotechnology Directive, which stipulates that the protection conferred by a
patent on a product containing or consisting of genetic information shall extend
“to all material, in which the product is incorporated and in which the genetic
information is contained and performs its function.” (Art. 9 of the EU
Biotechnology Directive). The wide approach put forward in the Directive causes
a lot of controversy. The central question in this debate was whether a patent for a
DNA sequence could encompass all possible future applications, or whether it
should be restricted to the specific use described in the patent application. In
other words, should DNA patents follow the regime of the classical, wide,
absolute protection (absoluter Stoffschutz)? Or should a restricted purpose-bound
protection (zweckgebundener or funktionsgebundener Schutz) apply? The European
Commission emphasized that it does not intend to take a particular standpoint
between classical and narrow scope of protection for DNA sequences.190 Based
on an analysis of the EU Biotechnology Directive, the Commission concluded
that a broad interpretation is acceptable (Art. 8, 9, 10 and 11 Directive) and that a
narrow scope might find support as well (Art. 5 (3) and Recitals 23 and
25 Directive).191 Next to the Commission, the European Parliament intervened in
the debate and called on the EPO and the EU member states to introduce a
restricted scope of patents on DNA sequences, and, more especially, “to grant
patents on human DNA only in connection with a concrete application and for
the scope of the patent to be limited to this concrete application so that other
users can use and patent the same DNA sequence for other applications (purpose
bound protection).”192
At present, most EPO contracting states have opted for the conventional

190. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF
PATENT LAW IN THE FIELD OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC ENGINEERING, COM (2005) 312
final (July 14, 2005), putting forward the question “whether patents on gene sequences (DNA
sequences) should be allowed in accordance with the classical model of patent claim, whereby a first
inventor can claim an invention which covers possible future uses of that sequence, or whether the
patent should be restricted so that only the specific use disclosed in the patent application may be
claimed ‘purpose-bound protection’” (See Point K of the text adopted).
191. See id. (the Commission intended to monitor for any economic consequences of possible
divergences between member states’ legislation on this point, but so far, no such studies have been
announced).
192. See European Parliament Resolution on Patents for Biotechnological Inventions of Oct.
26, 2005, 2006 O.J. (C 272) 440, 441 (EC). The European Parliament further called on the
Commission to “examine whether this interpretation of the Directive can be achieved by means of a
recommendation to the Member States or whether it requires an amendment” of the EU
Biotechnology Directive.
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absolute protection regime and only a few countries, such as France and Germany,
have given effect to the cry for limited product protection in the field of
genetics.193 Following a request for a preliminary ruling from the Court of The
Hague (the Netherlands), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
recently decided on the scope of DNA sequences incorporated in biological
material.194 Unfortunately, the Court did not clearly express its view in the
absolute/purpose bound debate.195
Policy lever
The use of the absolute product protection doctrine by some EPC
contracting states to expressly define the scope of patents in the area of genetics
and the introduction of purpose bound protection, turns this doctrine into a
national statutory macro policy lever. In the purpose-bound approach, only the
specific (disclosed) purpose of a substance is protected by a patent and any newly
found purpose should be subject of a new patent application. Such an approach is
motivated by the desire to restrict the stifling effect of gene patents on innovation,
and to safeguard the incentive for the development of new applications.
2.2.2. Clarity of claims
In general
European patent law requires that the claims “shall define the matter for
which protection is sought” and that they “shall be clear and concise and be
supported by the description.” (Art. 84 EPC). The Boards of Appeal have
repeatedly added that claims have to be clear for the sake of legal certainty, as their
purpose is to enable the protection conferred by the patent to be determined.196
193. See Geertrui Van Overwalle, The Implementation of the Biotechnology Directive in Belgium and its
Aftereffects: The Introduction of a New Research Exemption and a Compulsory License for Public Health, 37 INT’L
R. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 889, 889–1008 (2006). See also Timo Minssen, Es Bleibet
Dabei: Eine Schwedische Stellungnahme zur Europäischen Debatte über den Absoluten Erzeugnisschutz bei der
DNA-Patentierung [The Fact Remains: A Swedish Opinion on the European Debate on the Absolute
Product Protection for DNA Patenting], 3&4 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND
URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL [INTELL. PROP. L. INT’L R.] 93, 93–112 (2008).
194. Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, July 6, 2010, 2010 E.C.R. 7, available
at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/.
195. For a critical comment, see Geertrui Van Overwalle, The CJEU Monsanto Soybean Decision
and Patent Scope: As Clear as Mud, 1 INT’L R. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. (IIC) 1–3 (2011).
196. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 337/95 628 (Jan.
30, 1996), relating to European Patent Application No. 901033381 concerning 3-(substituted phenyl)
pyrazole derivatives, salts thereof, herbicides therefrom, and process for producing said derivatives or
salts. The Board emphasizes that claims have to be clear to ensure “that the public is not left in any
doubt as to which subject-matter is covered by a particular patent and which is not. This is one aspect
of legal certainty which is a principle of paramount importance in any system where the rights of the
public are affected by the granting of a monopoly (see J 34/92, not published in the O.J. E.P.O., No.
4.1 of the reasons for the decision).” Id. at 632 (Reason 2.4). For similar cases, see CASE LAW OF THE
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The EPC further prescribes that the claims shall define the matter for which
protection is sought “in terms of the technical features of the invention.”
(Rule 43 (1) EPC IRs). EPO case law has added that Art. 84 EPC has to be
interpreted as meaning that a claim must not only be comprehensible from a
technical point of view, but also define the object of the invention clearly, that is
to say, indicate all its essential features, understood as all features which are
necessary for solving the technical problem with which the application is
concerned.197
In chemistry
In chemistry, European patent applications with an unclear scope are often
filed, but rebutted. A typical example is the use of the term “active ingredient.” In
a case relating to the production of a concentrated aerosol space spray, claiming “a
composition essentially comprising 20–85% w/w active ingredient in adjunct with
suitable propellants,”198 the Board decided that the term “active ingredient” was
unclear, hence contrary to Art. 84 EPC.199 Another example is the use of the term
“substantially pure.” In a case claiming “a substantially pure piperidine
derivative,”200 the Board concluded that since there does not exist any unequivocal
generally accepted meaning in the relevant art for the feature “substantially pure,”
this feature casts doubts as to the actual subject matter covered by the claim and is
to be considered unclear and contrary to Art. 84 EPC.201
In biotechnology
The clarity of European biotech patent claims has quite often been subject
of disputes as well. A well-known example was the use of the term “higher” in the

BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, at 186.
197. See CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra
note 84, at 189.
198. See World Intellectual Property Organization International Patent Application No. WO
9204419 (A1), published Mar. 19, 1992. Claim 1 runs as follows: “a dispenser for space spraying
consisting of a container comprising a metering device, and a composition essentially comprising 20–
85% w/w active ingredient in adjunct with suitable propellants, solvents and other adjuvants.” Id. at
16. (Claims are not available for corresponding European Patent Application No. 0 591 195(A1)).
199. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 586/97 (Sept. 14,
2000), relating to European Patent Application No. 0 591 195 concerning a concentrated aerosol
space spray. The Board stated that when an essential ingredient comprised in a chemical composition
is open to be labeled arbitrarily “active ingredient” or not depending exclusively on the mental label
the user wishes to apply, thereby rendering the meaning of that feature protean, then the public is left
in doubts as to the distinction which compositions are covered by the claim and which are not, which
is at variance with the principle of legal certainty. Because of that lack of legal certainty, the claim fails
to meet the requirement of clarity imposed by Art. 84 EPC. Id. at 7 (Reason 4.1.2.2).
200. Claim 1 of European Patent Application No. 0 723 958 concerning substantially pure
piperidine derivative compounds.
201. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 728/98 (May 12,
2000), O.J. E.P.O. 319 (2001) (relating to European Patent Application No. 723 958).
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context of the production of erythropoietin. Here, the Board took the view that
what was to be measured was clear, namely values of the molecular weight of
urinary EPO, hence Art. 84 EPC was not violated.202 However, some observers
claim that in many biotech cases, it is by far not clear what some terms mean. A
key example is the use of the term “isolated.” According to the EU Biotechnology
Directive sequences are patentable if “isolated” from the human body (Art. 5 (2)
Directive). Following an in-depth analysis of diagnostic gene patents, they found
that the term “isolated” was seldom clarified in the patent description, and if a
definition was provided, instead of providing clarity, the intended meaning was
often further obscured due to the use of unclear or broad terms in the definition
itself, such as “substantially.”203
Unclarity also reigns with regard to the terms employed to depict nucleic acid
sequences. Such sequences may appear as DNA sequences, cDNA sequences,
RNA sequences, short fragments, primers, probes and so forth. To determine the
exact scope of the granted claim, and determine the freedom to operate—e.g.,
whether or not the use of a cDNA when performing a genetic diagnostic test
infringes upon the nucleic acid sequence at stake—it should be identified what
acts fall under the term “product” and under the term “use,”204 which, in this area,
is not straightforward.205

202. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 412/93 (Nov. 21,
1994) (relating to European Patent No. 0 148 605 (B1) concerning the production of erythropoietin
and awarded to Kirin Amgen. Most relevant here is claim 20.) The dispute related to claim 19 of
auxiliary request 11, which was based on Claim 20 as amended by the addition at the end of the claim
of the feature. Id. at 48. This amendment was objected to by some appellants for lack of clarity: use of
a term such as “higher” made this feature unclear and contravenes Art. 84 EPC. The Board
underlined, however, that what is to be measured is clear. Id. at 49 (Reason 60) (“Values of the
molecular weight of u-EPO measured by SDS-PAGE were part of the prior art. Frequently where
something has to be measured there will be a grey area where measurement error may make it difficult
to determine whether a particular product falls within a claim or not. This does not justify an
objection under Article 84 EPC.”).
In Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, T 586/97, supra note 199, the
Board decided differently. In the absence of any unambiguous reference point, a relative term such as
“lower alkyl” in the field of organic chemistry does not have a generally accepted meaning with
respect to its maximum number of carbon atoms, such a term is ambiguous and therefore not suitable
for clearly defining the subject matter for which protection is sought in a claim which is directed to a
group of organic compounds per se (Reason 2.8). Id. at 4.
203. See Huys et al., supra note 50.
204. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 28(1)(a),
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1867
U.N.T.S. 319 (“A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a) where the subject
matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts
of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product”) (emphasis
added).
205. Id.
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Policy lever
The demand for clear patent claims is put forward for any invention in any
technological field. It might well be that in “new” technological fields, the
requirement is applied more loosely, as no consensus has been reached yet on the
exact description of terms and concepts employed. The clear claims requirement
may then be employed as a judicial micro policy lever. Patent landscaping studies in
the field of gene patents indeed suggest that unclear terms are often used.206 The
downside of applying the clarity of claims doctrine with some flexibility is that it
creates vagueness about the exact scope of the claims and, consequently, increases
legal uncertainty.
2.2.3. Breadth of claims
In general
In the U.S., pioneering patents have traditionally been given wide protection,
allowing broad claims.207 However, the pioneer patent rule has not been invoked
by the Federal Circuit in recent years.208
In European patent law the demand that claims shall be “supported by the
description” (Art. 84 EPC) is interpreted as to mean that there must be a basis in
the description for the subject matter of every claim and that “the scope of the
claims must not be broader than is justified by the extent of the description and
drawings and also the contribution to the art.”209 In other words, it is the
definition of the invention in the claims that needs support.
According to EPO case law, this requirement reflects the general legal
principle that the extent of the patent monopoly, as defined by the claims, should
correspond to the technical contribution to the art in order for it to be supported
or justified. This means that the definitions in the claims should essentially
correspond to the scope of the invention as disclosed in the description: the
claims should not extend to subject matter which, after reading the description,
would still not be at the disposal of the person skilled in the art.210 Even though
European patent law sets forth that claims and scope must correspond, a certain

206. See Huys et al., supra note 50. See also Holman, supra note 50.
207. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 127 with the references cited in supra note 101. See
also CHISUM, supra note 52, § 18.04 [2].
208. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 127.
209. European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. III, § 6.1. (2010).
210. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 409/91 653 (Mar.
18, 1993), O.J. E.P.O. 653 (1994) relating to European Patent No. 0 261 958 concerning middle
distillate compositions with reduced wax crystal size (Point 3.3 of the Reasons). See also European
Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. C,
ch. III, § 6.1. (2010).
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degree of generalization is commonly accepted.211 Moreover, inventions which
open up a whole new field are entitled to more generality in the claims than
inventions which are concerned with advances in known technology.212 Thus,
European patent law is willing to provide wide protection for pioneering
inventions as well.
In biotechnology
In the early days of plant biotechnology, European patents have been
awarded wide claims. A typical example is one of the very first plant patents
granted in 1989 to Lubrizol Genetics, with patent claims for genetically modified
“plant cells”213 and “plants.”214 The claims were awarded, notwithstanding the fact
that the description disclosed transformation of only two plant families, namely
sunflower and tobacco.215 Similar claims were granted for other Agrobacteriumtumefaciens-mediated gene modification systems and the resulting transformed
“plant cells” and “plants.”216 Also in these cases, claims encompassing the whole
211. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. III, § 6.2. (2010) (“Most claims are generalizations from one or
more particular examples. The extent of generalization permissible is a matter which the examiner
must judge in each particular case in the light of the relevant prior art . . . . A fair statement of claim is
one which is not so broad that it goes beyond the invention nor yet so narrow as to deprive the
applicant of a just reward for the disclosure of his invention. The applicant should be allowed to
cover all obvious modifications of, equivalents to and uses of that which he has described. In
particular, if it is reasonable to predict that all the variants covered by the claims have the properties
or uses the applicant ascribes to them in the description, he should be allowed to draw his claims
accordingly.”).
212. Id.
213. See Claim 19 of European Patent No. 0 122 791 (B1) (issued Mar. 29, 1989) (“A plant cell
produced according to the method of any of Claims 10–18.”).
214. See id. at Claim 20 (“A plant or plant tissue grown from a plant cell according to claim
19.”).
215. See id. at 8 (stating that the “invention is exemplified by the introduction and expression
of phaseolin, a major seed storage protein of beans, into sunflower and tobacco plant tissues”).
216. See Claim 4 of European Patent No. 0 120 515 (B1) concerning a process for the
incorporation of foreign DNA into the genome of dicotyledonous plants awarded to Leiden
University (“Plants and plant cells obtained after the genetic properties of the original plants c.q. plant
cells have been modified with application of the process according to claim 1.”). See also Claim 19
European Patent No. 0 126 546 (B1) (“A plant, a plant tissue, or a plant cell produced according to
the method of any of Claims 9–18.”). The B1 document states once again that “the invention is
exemplified by introduction and expression of a structural gene for phaseolin, the major seed storage
protein of the bean Phaseolus vulgaris L., into sunflower and tobacco plant cells.” Id. at 8. Furthermore,
see Claim European Patent No. 0 131 620 (B1) at 23 (“A seed obtained from a plant produced by the
method of any of claims 5 to 7.”). The B1 document states:
[T]his invention is likely to be useful to transform cells from any type of plant
which can be infected by bacteria from the genus Agrobacterium. It is believed
that virtually all dicotyledonous plants, and certain monocots, can be infected
by one or more strains of Agrobacterium . . . . Certain types of plant cells can
be cultured in vitro and regenerated into differentiated plants using techniques
known to those skilled in the art. Such plant types include potatoes, tomatoes,
carrots, alfalfa and sunflowers.
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plant kingdom were awarded, including both dicotyledonous and
monocotyledonous plants, even though the experiments described in the patent
specification were related to a few varieties of plants only, mostly potatoes,
tomatoes, carrots, alfalfa, and/or sunflowers.
Wide claims were also granted at the onset of animal biotechnology. The
most prominent example here is the patent granted for the Harvard onco-mouse,
with claims for a “non-human mammalian animal,”217 even though the description
only disclosed experiments with mice.218 The application and grant of these
pioneering plant and animal patents gave rise to a great deal of EPO
jurisprudence. However, the disputes mostly revolved around the eligibility of
animals for patent protection219 and hardly ever focused on the breadth of the
claims at hand.220
Broad formulation can also be witnessed in the area of human genetics, even
today. Patents relating to human genes quite often encompass broadly formulated
gene claims, covering many types of genes.221 Gene patents often include broad
method claims as well, claiming the link between a mutation and a disease without

Id. at 14. For further information, see GEERTRUI VAN OVERWALLE, OCTROOIEERBAARHEID VAN
PLANTENBIOTECHNOLOGISCHE UITVINDINGEN [PATENTABILITY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGICAL
INVENTIONS] 739 (1996).
217. See Claim 19 of European Patent No. 0 169 672 (B1), supra note 72, at 11 (“A transgenic
non-human mammalian animal whose germ cells and somatic cells contain an activated oncogene
sequence as a result of chromosomal incorporation into the animal genome, or into the genome of an
ancestor of said animal, said oncogene optionally being further defined according to any one of the
claims 3 to 10.”).
218. For more, see Van Overwalle, supra note 59.
219. More in particular in the light of the exclusion of plant and animal varieties in European
Patent Convention Art. 53(b), now interpreted somewhat more liberally thanks to Art. 4 of EU
Biotech Directive at 18, and its counterpart in the European Patent Convention, supra note 24,
Implementing Regulations, Pt. II, Ch. V, R. 27. For more on the line of case law on plant and animals
patents, see VAN OVERWALLE, supra note 60; Geertrui Van Overwalle, Biotechnology and Patents: Global
Standards, European Approaches and National Accents, in GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE WORLD
TRADE SYSTEM 77 (Daniel Wüger & Thomas Cottier eds., 2008).
220. In the Harvard onco-mouse case, European Patent No. 0 169 672 (B1) (issued May 13,
1992),, breadth of claims was indeed an issue. After intense debate, the EPO Opposition Division
narrowed the claim down to rodents and the EPO Technical Board of Appeal later narrowed it to
transgenic mice, mainly on ethical grounds, particularly animal suffering.
221. See Thomas B. Kepler, Colin Crossman & Robert Cook-Deegan, Metastasizing Patent
Claims on BRCA1, 95 GENOMICS 312 (2010). Many patents make claims on DNA sequences; some
include claims on oligonucleotides related to the primary patented gene. Kepler et al. used
bioinformatics to quantify the reach of one such claim from U.S. patent 4.747.282 on BRCA1. They
found that human chromosome 1 (which does not contain BRCA1) contains over 300,000
oligonucleotides covered by this claim, and that 80% of cDNA and mRNA sequences contributed to
GenBank before the patent application was filed also contain at least one claimed oligonucleotide.
Any “isolated” DNA molecules that include such 15 bp nucleotide sequences would fall under the
claim as granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Anyone making, using, selling, or
importing such a molecule for any purpose within the United States would thus be infringing the
claim. This claim and others like it turn out, on examination, to be surprisingly broad, and if enforced
would have substantial implications for medical practice and scientific research.
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specifying steps as to how this link is determined. A typical example here is the
claim related to the testing for spinocerebellar ataxia 6 (SCA6) demanding
protection for “a method of determining whether an individual has or is at risk for
developing spinocerebellar ataxia type 6 (SCA-6), comprising assessing whether
the number of CAG nucleotide repeat units in the alpha1A calcium channel
subunit gene of said individual is greater than a control number, thereby indicating
that said individual has or is at risk for developing SCA6,” and thereby referring to
the use of “any” test.222 In view of the prevailing patentability criteria it has been
suggested that it should be impossible to construe claims so broadly that they
would cover an indefinite number of tests.223 However, the examples show that
nevertheless, such broad claims are granted.224
Policy lever
The pioneering patent rule and related breadth of claim doctrine is a judicial
micro policy lever. Application of the nominally neutral rule is likely to result in
differing claim language and differing patent protection in different industries.
Burk and Lemley suggest that the rule produces effects in the pharmaceutical
industry, where innovation is likely to take the form of discrete new inventions
opening up entire fields of inquiry and new markets for treatment of an illness or
disease. By contrast, industries such as software are characterized by incremental
improvements.225 This view should be put in perspective for two reasons. First,
recent surveys point out that a lot of incremental improvements take place in the
pharmaceutical sector as well, leading to so-called evergreening.226 More
importantly, rather than suggesting that the pioneering patent rule creates
differences among industries, the pioneering rule may lead to differences in one
and the same industry, favoring research and development in the explorative and
pioneering high days within that industry, and reluctantly accommodating
advances in later years. Thus broad claims are more likely to be accepted in “new”
technology fields, such as the early days of biotechnology, rather than in “known”
technologies, such as the later stages within those areas of biotechnology which
have already been widely explored.
Moreover, it may be doubted that the pioneering patent rule is always
applied consistently, even within the same (stage within an) industry.227
222.
European Patent No. 1 015 628, Claim 1, at 34 (providing a method of screening
individuals at risk for developing diseases caused by trinucleotide repeat sequence instability).
223. See Huys et al., supra note 50.
224. Id.
225. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 127–28.
226. See European Commission, The Final Report of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, (July 8,
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html.
227. As we have clearly demonstrated, the EPO grants wide protection for transgenic plants:
based on experiments with only a few plant varieties, claims were awarded for “plants.” This seems at
odds with the instructions in the European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for
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2.3. Patent Rights and Limitations
2.3.1. Research exemption
In general
In the U.S. the research exemption exists as a judicially created theory.228 The
exception has recently been narrowed down considerably in the landmark case
Madey v. Duke University.229 In Madey v. Duke University—which in fact involved
electron laser technology—it was recalled that:
Regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an
endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the
alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strict philosophical inquiry, the act does not
qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use
defense.230
Furthermore, the profit or nonprofit status of the user is not decisive for the
applicability of the doctrine.
In Europe, the research exemption is phrased as a statutory restriction to the
rights of the patent holder. The original European “mother” provision states that
the rights that are conferred by a patent shall not extend to “acts done for
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented invention.”231
The equivalent provisions in the European member states mirror but sometimes
deviate from this wording. Because different national legislations and court rulings
exist, the exact scope of the exemption differs from country to country. However,
there seems to be a general consensus that the exemption applies irrespective of
Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. III, §6.1. (2010), and more in particular the
example relating to “plant seedlings”:
The question of support is illustrated by the following example: (i) seedlings by
subjecting them to a controlled cold shock so as to produce specified results,
whereas the description discloses the process applied to one kind of plant only.
Since it is well-known that plants vary widely in their properties, there are wellfounded reasons for believing that the process is not applicable to all plant
seedlings. Unless the applicant can provide convincing evidence that the
process is nevertheless generally applicable, he must restrict his claim to the
particular kind of plant referred to in the description. A mere assertion that the
process is applicable to all plant seedlings is not sufficient.
Id. § 6.3.
228. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 16.03.
229. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
230. Id. at 1362.
231. See Article 27 of the Agreement relating to Community patents, done at Luxembourg on
Dec. 15, 1989, 1989 O.J. (L 401) 1–27. The so-called Community Patent Convention has never
entered into force. Discussions were resumed in 2000 in The Framework of a Proposal for a Council
Regulation on the Community Patent, COM (2000) 412 final (Jan. 8, 2000).
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the place of the experiment: experiments are exempted, whether they are carried
in a public laboratory, a hospital, or a private company. Agreement also exists with
regard to the nature of the experiments: experiments “on” the patented subject
matter fall under the research exemption, whereas experiments “with” the
patented subject matter are not shielded by the exception. Doubts mainly arise
with regard to the final purpose of the experiment: are only experiments with a
strict noncommercial scientific goal exempted, or also experiments with a
commercial or a mixed scientific/commercial objective?232
In biotechnology
In an aim to foster biotechnological innovation, and more in particular, to
shield the use of research tools233 from infringement, the patent legislator of one
European member state, namely Belgium, decided to reshape and widen the
research exemption. In 2005, the Belgian Patent Act was reworded to stipulate
that the rights of a patent holder do not extend to “acts carried out for scientific
purposes ‘on’ or ‘with’ the subject matter of the invention.”234 The new wording
aims at both exempting research “on” and research “with” the subject matter of
the invention to guarantee a maximum freedom to operate for research activities.
“On” refers to experiments where it is verified whether the patented invention
works the way it is described in the patent or whether the invention is indeed
novel and inventive as claimed in the patent, in other words, experiments relating
to the activity, function, usefulness, or feasibility of the patented invention itself.
Experiments “with” refers to experiments where the patented invention is used to
investigate something else, in other words, where the patented invention is used as
an instrument, as an “Apparativ” (for instance, a patented scale which is used to
weigh compounds for manufacturing a vaccine).
The new wording aims at exempting both experiments with a strict scientific
232. There is a vast literature on this issue. See, e.g., P. DIE CHROCZIEL, BENUTZUNG
PATENTIERTER ERFINDUNGEN ZU VERSUCHS-UND FORSCHUNGSZWECKEN (1986); William R.
Cornish, Experimental Use of Patented Inventions in European Community States, 29 INT’L REV. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 735, 735–53 (1998); Joseph Straus, The Research Exemption: The Situation in
Germany, in OCTROOIRECHT EN GENEESMIDDELEN [PATENT LAW AND MEDICINES] 107, 107–20
(Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2000); Geertrui Van Overwalle et al., Models for Facilitating Access to Patents
on Genetic Inventions, 7(2) NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 143, 143–48 (2006).
233. Research tools are instruments, reagents, methods, and information, the main
commercial value of which is furthering research, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE
BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 51–53 (2006).
234. New wording of Art. 28 (2) of the Belgian Patent Act, Wet van 28 April 2005 tot
Wijziging van de Wet van 28 Maart 1984 op de Uitvindingsoctrooien, wat Betreft de
Octrooieerbaarheid van de Biotechnologische Uitvindingen [introduced by the Act of Apr. 28, 2005
to modify the Act of Mar. 28 1984 on Invention Patents, with Regard to the Patentability of
Biotechnological Inventions], BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 13,
2005, 3d ed., http://www.staatsbald.be. For an in-depth analysis of the renewed Belgian research
exemption, see Van Overwalle, supra note 193, at 889–920.
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purpose and acts with a mixed scientific/commercial aim.235 Indeed, in the debate
on whether to opt for a strict or a wide interpretation of the notion “scientific
purpose,” the Belgian legislator opts for a wide scope of interpretation. In the
strict approach, only acts serving a strict scientific goal, aimed at expanding
knowledge or testing a proposition, are shielded from infringement. In a wide
approach, acts with a strict scientific or a mixed scientific and commercial goal,
aimed at developing new applications, improved therapeutic effects, more
effective production methods, new indications, etc., are also exempted. Purely
commercial acts236 do not in any way fall under the renewed research
exemption.237
Policy lever
The conventional European research exemption (research-“on”-exemption)
might well be a statutory micro policy lever, introduced to foster research and
follow-on innovation across sectors, and resorting wider effect in certain sectors
than others. The broadened Belgian research exemption (research-“on”/“with”exemption) can definitely be seen as a statutory macro policy lever, intended to foster
innovation in a specific industry, namely the biotechnology industry. Our
conclusion on this point is fully in line with the observations expressed by Burk
and Lemley, that the statutory experimental-use-“on” provision functions as a
global policy lever, pertaining to affect all industry sectors, whereas the
experimental-use-“with” provision, although nominally industry-neutral,
constitutes in fact a macro policy lever for the biotechnology industry.238
However, it remains to be seen to what extent the broadened research
exception or experimental-use-“with” exemption will indeed fulfill its primary
objective of enabling use of patented products and tools, and stimulate (mixed
fundamental and commercial) research and development in the field of
biotechnology. Doubtful borderline cases may arise in day-to-day practice. What
about spin-offs originating from university-based research with commercial
objectives? Or pharmaceutical and/or biotechnology companies having a clear-cut
235. See Marc Verwilghen, Statement of the Minister for Economic Affairs, on the Scope of
the Research Exemption, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique [House of Representative of
Belgium] Doc. 51 1348/006, 2004–2005, at 58–59 (Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.lachambre
.be/FLWB/pdf/51/1348/51K1348006.pdf (provided that mixed research is mainly scientific in
nature, which excludes companies with mainly commercial goals, from the scope of the exemptions).
See also Marc Verwilghen, Statement of the Minister for Economic Affairs, on the Scope of the
Research Exemption, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique [House of Representative of Belgium]
Doc. 3-1088/3, 2004–2005 at 2.
236. E.g., the preparation of the registration dossier for clinical trials and acts required in order
to be eligible for a license to commercialize so-called me-too medicines.
237. See Council Directive 2004/27/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 34 (EC) (the preparation of the
registration dossier for clinical trials are exempted from patent infringement under this Directive and
the equivalent Belgian variant of the so-called “Bolar” exemption).
238. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 113.

Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete)

492

11/7/2011 10:16 AM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:2

commercial mission, but hosting large research activities as well? But, more
importantly, there might be a tremendous downside to establishing a wide
experimental-use-“with” exemption. Trade secret protection might increase or,
even worse, research activities might be stifled in those sectors where new
research tools are being developed, as a result of the fact that the prospect of an
adequate patent protection is being eroded.239
2.3.2. Compulsory licensing
In general
Many countries around the world allow compulsory licenses in their national
legislation. In Europe, national legislators have traditionally introduced
compulsory licenses for failure to work patents, dependency of patents, and public
interest motives such as national economy, national security, or national
emergency.240
The U.S. is often thought of as one of the few countries without compulsory
license mechanisms. But in fact, in a limited number of cases, U.S. courts or
government officials may grant compulsory licenses on the basis of specific legal
provisions.241 Furthermore, in U.S. patent and antitrust cases the actual effect of a
refusal of a judge to grant an injunction to the patent owner, or an order to license
out will be that the alleged infringer can continue using the patented subject
matter under the conditions set by the court without the authorization of the
patent owner. Hence, the ultimate effects are similar to the grant of a compulsory
license.242
In biotechnology
In the aftermath of the Myriad controversy,243 various European countries
239. See Geertrui Van Overwalle, Research Tools in the R&D Phase, Belgian Report Prepared for
The Institute for Future Technology (IFTECH) and Commissioned by the Japanese Patent Office 40
(2008).
240. For an in-depth analysis of the history, the grounds, the application procedure, and the
scope of the various types of compulsory licenses, see Esther Van Zimmeren & Geertrui Van
Overwalle, A Paper Tiger? Compulsory License Regimes for Public Health in Europe, 1 INT’L R. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 4, 4–40 (2011).
241. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006) (government use); 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2006) (Atomic
Energy Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2006) (Clean Air Act); 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2006) (Plant Variety
Protection Act); 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) (“march in right” in the so-called Bayh-Dole Act).
242. Van Zimmeren & Van Overwalle, supra note 240.
243. Myriad Genetics obtained several European and U.S. patents for the screening of breast
cancer genes, but licensed the test exclusively to a limited number of commercial genetic laboratories
within specific geographical regions. This highly restrictive licensing policy gave rise to a strong and
worldwide reaction. There is a vast literature on the European response to the Myriad patents. The
interested reader might care to take a look at Gert Matthijs & Dicky Halley, European-Wide Opposition
Against the Breast Cancer Gene Patents, 10 EUR. J. HUM. GENET. 783 (2002); KAROLINA A.
HERRLINGER, DIE PATENTIERUNG VON KRANKHEITSGENEN [THE PATENTING OF DISEASE
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have adjusted existing compulsory license regimes, or designed additional
compulsory license mechanisms to remedy problems resulting from restrictive
licensing practices in the area of genetics, in particular in the field of genetic
testing. In France, the existing compulsory license for public interest was
broadened to include genetic diagnostics in 2004.244 In Belgium a new compulsory
license for public health was introduced in the Patent Act in 2005.245 The French
and Belgian compulsory license is considered legitimate for reasons of public
health if the quantity or the quality of medicines or methods available to the public
is insufficient, if medicines or methods are only available at abnormally high
prices, if the patent is exploited in a manner contrary to public health interests, or
if the patent is worked in a manner resulting in anticompetitive practices qualified
as such in a final administrative or court decision.246 The compulsory license not
only can be invoked against obstructive patents in the field of diagnostics but also
against patents in the pharmaceutical field at large. In particular compulsory
licenses can be granted with respect to patents issued for “medicines, medical
devices, in vitro diagnostic medical devices, related therapeutic products, processes
GENES] (2005); Ian R. Walpole et al., Human Gene Patents: The Possible Impacts on Genetic Services
Healthcare, 179 MED. J. AUST. 203 (2003); Geertrui Van Overwalle, IPR Issues and High Quality Genetic
Testing, in QUALITY ISSUES IN CLINICAL GENETIC SERVICES 251 (Ulf Kristoffersson et al. eds.,
2010).
244. See Art. 18 of Loi 2004–800 du 6 août 2004 relative à la Bioéthique [Law 2004–800 of
Aug. 6, 2004 on Bioethics], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 7, 2004, Text 1 of 92. See also Art. 10 of Loi 2004–1338 du 8 Décembre
2004 relative à la Protection des Inventions Biotechnologiques [Law 2004–1338 of Dec. 8, 2004 on
the Protection of Biotechnological Inventions], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE,
Dec. 8, 2004, Text 1 of 95.
Switzerland also included a separate compulsory license in case of anticompetitive practices
with regard to diagnostic products or processes. See Bundesgesetz über die Erfindungspatente
[Federal Law on Patents for Invention] June 22, 2007, AS 2551–584 (2008) (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/as/2008/2551.pdf. The Swiss regime will not be further discussed here.
For more, see Christophe Germann, The Swiss Approach to Compulsory Licensing for Diagnostic Products and
Processes, in GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 149–58 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2007); Van
Zimmeren & Van Overwalle, supra note 240.
245. Article 31 bis of the Belgian Patent Act, introduced by the Act of Apr. 28, 2005 to
modify the Act of Mar. 28, 1984 on Invention Patents, with regard to the Patentability of
Biotechnological Inventions, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 13,
2005, 3d ed., http://www.staatsbald.be. For an in-depth analysis of the history, scope and application
procedure of this newly designed license, see Jérôme Debrulle et al., La licence obligatoire belge pour raisons
de santé publique in GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 81, at 161–98 (with a summary in
English at 199-209); Van Overwalle, supra note 193.
246. CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [hereinafter C.P.I.] art. L.613-16 (Fr.). The
Belgian Patent Act stipulates that “[in] the interest of public health, the King, by decree established after
consultation in the Council of Ministers, can grant a license for the exploitation and application of an
invention protected by a patent.” See Article 31 of the Belgian Patent Act, supra note 245, § 1
(emphasis added). These examples are largely a reflection of the examples provided in the French IP
Code. The proposal to include this more detailed wording also in the Belgian Patent Act in order to
increase the transparency and the strength of the provision was refused. So, rather than defining the
notion “public health” in the patent act, the concept is clarified by providing some examples in a
political statement. Id.
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for obtaining such products, products necessary in obtaining these products,
processes for manufacturing such products, and ex vivo diagnostic methods.”247
Policy lever
The traditional compulsory license regimes for non-working and dependency
are statutory micro policy levers. These license mechanisms have been designed to
“prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights
conferred by the patent,”248 irrespective of the sector or area where these abuses
might emerge. It is quite likely, however, that the compulsory license for
dependency will be employed more often in sectors characterized by follow-on
innovation than other industries. The newly shaped compulsory license regime for
public health is definitely a statutory macro policy lever. Although initially designed
as a measure to resolve problems in the area of genetics, it is conceived as a
remedy to solve problems in the pharmaceutical field at large.
Rather than a direct measure to seize abusive patent holders, the compulsory
license may act as an indirect policy instrument with a preventive and dissuading
effect towards patent holders applying (extremely) restrictive licensing policies and
may compel a noncooperative patent holder to enter into fair and reasonable
licensing negotiations. It is exactly this preventive threat function which may turn
the compulsory licensing mechanism into more than just another tool of symbolic
247. C.P.I. art. L.613-16. In the Belgian Patent Act the scope of application has been modeled
after the French system. Compulsory licenses can be granted for “a) a medicine, a medical device, a
medical device or product for diagnosis, a derived or combinable therapeutic product; b) the process
or product necessary for the fabrication of one or more products indicated under a); and c) a
diagnostic method applied outside the human or animal body.” Id. at Art. 31 bis §1. Translation
provided by Van Overwalle & Haasl in GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 81.
One of the reasons why the field of application of the compulsory license regime was broadened
from diagnostics to pharmaceuticals, was to avoid the criticism that the new regime runs counter to
the nondiscrimination prescription of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. Some have argued, however, that this was not
necessary, as the TRIPS rule only applies to the grant of patent rights, TRIPS Art. 27.
In addition to national initiatives to solve domestic public health problems, European legislation
has been introduced to aid developing countries with health problems. A European Regulation on
compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to
countries with public health problems was accepted in 2006. Council Regulation 816/2006, on
Compulsory Licensing of Patents Relating to the Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products for Export
to Countries with Public Health Problems, 2006 O.J. (L157) (EC). The regulation obliges Member
States to grant a compulsory license for the manufacture and sale of patented pharmaceutical
products for export to countries without or with insufficient production facilities in the
pharmaceutical sector so long as a number of conditions are fulfilled. For some more background
information, see Paul Vandoren & Patrick Ravillard, A New EC Initiative to Allow Export of Medicines
under Compulsory Licences to Poor Countries, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 103. See also Compulsory Licensing
of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS: Frequently Asked Questions, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Jan. 24, 2011), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm.
248. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5.A.2, Mar. 20, 1883, 828
U.N.T.S. 305.
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lawmaking.
2.3.3. Patent term
In general
U.S. patent law sets forth that a patent shall last for twenty years from the
date on which the patent application was filed (35 U.S.C. § 154 (a) (2) (2010)).
Similarly, European patent law prescribes that the term of the European patent
shall be twenty years from the date of filing of the application (Art. 63 (1°) EPC).
In medicine and biotechnology
From 1991 onwards, EPC contracting states can extend the term of a
European patent, under the same conditions as those applying to national patents,
if the subject matter of the European patent is a product or a process for
manufacturing a product or a use of a product which has to undergo an
administrative authorization procedure required by law before it can be put on the
market in that state (Art. 63 (2) EPC). As a result, various EU member states have
promulgated an extension regime of maximum five years in the pharmaceutical
sector249 (resulting in so-called supplementary protection certificates), extendable
with an extra six months for medicinal products for pediatric use.250 In the U.S.,
similar extension regimes exist for pharmaceutical patents.251
Next to regimes providing longer terms of protection in certain sectors,
alternative national regimes have been put in place with shorter protection terms,
amounting to so-called “petty patents,” “utility models,” or “Gebrauchsmuster.”252
However, in an attempt to harmonize the varying national regimes on this

249. See Council Regulation 1768/92 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
June 1992 (the Creation of a Supplementary Protection Certificate for Medicinal Products). For an indepth analysis, see VAN OVERWALLE, supra note 232. A similar extension regime of five years has
been introduced for plant protection products. See Council Regulation 1610/96 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 Concerning the Creation of a Supplementary
Protection Certificate for Plant Protection Products, 1996 O.J. (L 198) 30–35.
250. See Council Regulation 1901/2006, 1996 O.J. (L 378) 1 (EC) of Dec. 12, 2006 on
Medicinal Products for Pediatric Use and Amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1768/92, Council
Directive 2001/20/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 121) 34 (EC), Council Directive 2001/83/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 311)
67 (EC), and Council Regulation (EC) 726/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 1 (EC).
251. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98–
417, 98 Stat. 1585; 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002).
252. For the regime in Germany, see, e.g., Karsten Königer, Registration Without Examination: The
Utility Model—A Useful Model, in 6 PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED
WORLD (Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont et al. eds., 2009); for the regime in the Netherlands, see, e.g.,
E.A. Van Nieuwenhoven Helbach, Sier-en gebruiksmodellen, in A1-15 CIER-LEZINGEN.
MODELLENRECHT (1986–1987); for the regime in Belgium, see, e.g., Geertrui Van Overwalle, Europese
Harmonisatie in het Octrooirecht, het Kwekersrecht en het Bebruiksmodellenrecht: van Wiel Naar Mens naar Wieltje,
INTELLECTUELE RECHTEN—DROITS INTELLECTUELS 149, 149–68 (1998).
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point,253 the EU legislature clearly stated that inventions relating to biological
material or to chemical or pharmaceutical substances or processes were excluded
from such protection regimes,254 because utility model protection is tailored to
technical inventions involving a specific (read: lower) level of inventiveness, 255
which is out of place in biology and pharma.256
Policy lever
The supplementary protection certificate regime is a clear example of a
statutory macro policy lever. Prolongation of the patent term has been introduced
explicitly to accommodate the need for an adequate term of protection in specific
industries, namely industries characterized by substantial administrative
authorization procedures, such as the pharmaceutical sector. The patent term
extension initiative shows an increased interest from the legislator to tailor patent
law to the administrative needs of particular industries, in casu the pharmaceutical
industry. Here, the extension is triggered in an attempt to achieve differentiation
of amortization/return on investment possibilities.
The utility model framework is an example of a mixed statutory micro/macro
policy lever. Although the utility model regime could in principle apply in all
industry sectors, a major impact was expected in industries characterized by minor
technical inventions, such as mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, and
the automotive industry,257 as well as microtechnology, micromechanics, toy
manufacture, clock and watch making, and optics.258 The utility model thus
functions as a micro policy lever. Since the utility model is expressly not made
available for biological and pharmaceutical inventions, the utility model acts as a
macro policy lever as well.

253. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Directive Approximating
the Legal Arrangements for the Protection of Inventions by Utility, at 13, COM (1997) 691 final (Feb. 3, 1998).
See also Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Legal
Arrangements for the Protection of Inventions by Utility Model at 2, COM (1999) 309 final (July 12, 1999).
254. See Article 4 (b) and (c) of EU Utility Model Proposal, 1997.
255. See Art. 6 of the Commission of the European Communities, Amended Proposal for an
European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Legal Arrangements for the
Protection of Inventions by Utility Model (1997). See also id. at Recital 7.
256. See id. §62 (“[T]hese sectors are complex ones in which property rights involving no
examination as to novelty or inventive step are out of place.”). The European Union Utility Model
Proposal was later withdrawn, following the screening exercise of proposals on which the EU
legislator had not yet reached a decision and which were found not to be consistent with the Lisbon
and Better Regulation criteria, unlikely to make further progress in the legislative process, or found to
be no longer topical for objective reasons. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament, Outcome of the Screening of Legislative Proposals Pending Before the Legislator, at 3, COM
(2003) 462 final (Sept. 27, 2005); see also Withdrawal of Commission Proposals Following Screening
for their General Relevance, Their Impact on Competitiveness and Other Aspects, 2006 O.J. (C 64) 3.
257. See supra note 255, §§ 35, 45.
258. See id. §6.
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3. CONCLUSIONS
Our European-U.S. tour d’horizon has now come to an end. Time has come to
stand back and conclude on the peculiarities of the policy levers put into operation
in Europe, and sketch a few lines of comparison with the U.S. landscape.
3.1. European Policy Levers in Biotechnology
3.1.1. Policy levers
Our study reveals that many policy levers are put into operation to tailor
European patent law to biotechnological innovation in Europe. In total, some
seventeen policy levers have been uncovered in current European patent law
which have particular effect on the biotech (or adjacent chemical and
pharmaceutical) industry (see Table 2. Detailed Overview of European Policy
Levers in Biotechnology). In the category of patent acquisition, policy levers
concerning patentable subject matter have been put into operation, more in
particular the technical character rule, the morality clause, and the medical method
doctrine. Levers concerning patentability requirements have also been used, by
adjusting the novelty requirement (first and second medical use doctrine, selection
invention rules, and testing exemption), the inventive step requirement
(expectation of success doctrine and secondary indicia approach), the industrial
applicability standard, the skilled person doctrine, and the enabling disclosure
requirement. In the field of patent scope, policy levers have been handled
concerning product patent claim scope, clarity of claims, and breadth of claims. In
the area of patent rights, policy levers have been used including the research
exemption, the compulsory license, and patent term.
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Table 2. Detailed Overview of European Policy Levers in
Biotechnology
CATEGORY
1.

POLICY LEVER

DESCRIPTION

PATENT
ACQUISITION

Patentable subject matter

Inventions and
discoveries
(technical
character)




Morality









Medical methods






Novelty

Industry neutral
Effect on innovation in biotechnology
(human DNA)
Micro policy lever
Originally jurisprudential (EPO), now
statutory (EU)
Industry neutral
Effect on innovation in biotechnology
(transgenic plants, transgenic animals,
human DNA, human stem cells)
Micro policy lever
Originally statutory (EPC), then
jurisprudential (EPO), now statutory (EU)
Industry specific
Aimed at having effect on innovation in
health care
Macro policy lever
Statutory (EPC)

Medical use

First medical use






Second medical
use






Selection invention

Testing exemption










Industry specific
Effect mainly on innovation in
pharmaceutical sector
Macro policy lever
Statutory (EPC)
Industry specific
Effect mainly on innovation in
pharmaceutical sector
Macro policy lever
Originally jurisprudential (EPO), now
statutory (EPC)
Industry neutral
Effect mainly on innovation in
pharmaceutical and chemical sector
Micro policy lever
Jurisprudential (EPO)
Industry neutral
Effection mainly on innovation in
pharmaceutical and biotechnological sector
Micro policy lever
Jurisprudential (EPO)
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Table 2 (continued)
Inventive step

Expectation of
success








Industry neutral
Effect on innovation in young (vs.
established) industries, hence indirect effect
in biotechnology
Micro policy lever
Jurisprudential (EPO)
Industry neutral
Effect unclear for the moment
Micro policy lever?
Jurisprudential (EPO)

DNA






Industry specific
Higher standard in biotechnology (DNA)
Macro policy lever
Statutory (EU)

General




Industry neutral
Effect on downstream (vs. upstream)
innovation closer to market, hence indirect
effect on innovation in biotechnology
sector
Micro policy lever
Jurisprudential (EPO)
Industry neutral
Effect on innovation in new (vs. old) and
advanced (vs. low) technologies, hence
indirect effect on biotechnology
Micro policy lever
Jurisprudential (EPO)
Industry specific
Higher standard in biotechnology
Macro policy lever
Originally jurisprudential (EPO), now
statutory (EPC IRs)
Industry specific
Limited (purpose bound) scope in
biotechnology (DNA)
Macro policy lever
Statutory (national) (EU)
Industry neutral
Effect on innovation in biotechnology
(DNA)
Micro policy lever
Jurisprudential (EPO)
Industry neutral
Effect on innovation in new (vs. known)
technologies, hence indirect effect in
biotechnology in the early days
Micro policy lever
Jurisprudential (EPO)

Secondary
indicia—
commercial
success
Industrial applicability

Skilled person

Industrial
applicability

PSITA

Enabling disclosure

Written description

2. PATENT

Scope of product
claims

SCOPE




Clarity of claims

Breadth of claims
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Table 2 (continued)
3. PATENT RIGHTS &
LIMITATIONS

Research
exemption

Research-“on”exemption






Research-“on”/
“with”-exemption






Industry neutral
Effect on innovation in biotechnology
(DNA, research tools)
Micro policy lever
Statutory (EU + national)
Industry specific
Created to have an effect on follow-on
innovation in biotechnology (DNA,
research tools)
Micro policy lever
Statutory (national)

Compulsory
licensing

For dependence






For public
health/public
interest






Industry neutral
Effect on sectors characterized by followon innovation
Micro policy lever
Statutory (national)
Industry specific
Effect on innovation in pharmacy
(medicines) and biotechnology (diagnostic
methods)
Macro policy lever
Statutory (national)

Patent term

Longer:
Supplementary
Protection
Certificate (SPC)




Shorter: utility
model










Industry specific
Effect on innovation in pharmaceutical
sector
Macro policy lever
Statutory (national)
Industry neutral
Effect in sectors with lower level of
innovation
Micro policy lever
Statutory (EU)

The list of policy levers presented here is by no means exhaustive. Additional
rules, standards, or doctrines can most likely be uncovered. Rather, the policy
levers discussed here can be considered as the most visible exponents, as yet, of
the attempt of the European patent actors (legislators and courts) to tailor patent
law to the needs of the biotechnology sector. The multitude of levers shows that
the current European patent system holds substantial potential for technologyspecific application of its patent law. Even though the EPC may have been
conceived at its inception as a nominally neutral patent statute, our study clearly
reveals that substantial discretion to differ the patent system by industry, and in
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particular to tailor it to the specificities of the biotechnology sector, is built into
the system over the years. Although the EPC was introduced as a unitary259
regulatory tool, intended to operate the same way across technologies, EPO case
law has shown increased interest and ability in tailoring patent law to the needs of
distinct technology sectors, and in particular the biotechnology sector.
3.1.2. Macro versus micro policy levers
Our study shows that in Europe substantially more micro policy levers have
been set to work in the biotechnology sector than macro policy levers (see Table 3.
Comparison of the Various European Policy Levers in Biotechnology; see also
Table 4. Summary of the Various European Policy Levers in Biotechnology).

259. The term “unitary” comes from BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 65, as does the term
“uniform,”id. at 95.
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Table 3. Comparison of the Various European Policy Levers in
Biotechnology*

Statutory

EPC

EU
(Biotech
Directive)
EU →
national

National

Jurisprudential

EPO

Jurisprudential →
Statutory

EPO →
EU
(Biotech
Directive)
EPO →
EPC
EPC →
EPO →
EU

Statutory →
Jurisprudential →
Statutory

Macro policy lever
(industry specific)
Pre-grant
Post-grant
(acquisition, scope)
(rights, limitations)
 Medical
methods
 Medical use
(first)
 Industrial
applicability
(DNA)

 Limited
scope
product
claims
(purpose
bound)

Micro policy lever
(industry neutral)
Pre-grant
Post-grant
(acquisition, scope)
(rights, limitations)

 Research
exemption (“on”)
 Patent term
(shorter)
 Compulsory license
(dependency)

 Research
exemption
(“on”/“with”)
 Compulsory
license (public
health)
 Patent term
(longer)
 Selection
invention
 Testing
exemption
 Expectation
of success
 Commercial
success
 Industrial
applicability
(general)
 PSITA
 Clarity of
claims
 Breadth of
claims
 Invention
(technical
character)

 Medical use
(second)

 Enabling
disclosure
 Morality

*The policy levers which were split up (first/second medical use; industrial applicability
DNA/general; research on/on-with; compulsory license for dependency/public health; patent
term longer/shorter) have been printed in italics.
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The prevalence of micro policy levers in Europe rather comes as a surprise.
We expected that a relation would show up between the nature of policy measure
(macro/micro) and the type of policy actor (legislator/court), and expected a
positive correlation between macro policy levers and statutory measures. Indeed,
given the civil law background in which European (patent) law develops, a
prevalence of well-articulated macro rules openly set forth by the legislature was
anticipated. However, a clear prevalence of jurisprudential micro policy levers
emerged.

Table 4. Summary of the Various European Policy Levers in
Biotechnology *
Macro policy lever

Micro policy lever

Pre-grant
(acquisition,
scope)

Pre-grant
(acquisition,
scope)

Post-grant
(rights,
limitations)

Post-grant
(rights,
limitations)

Statutory
4
3
3
10
(EPC+EU+
national)
Jurisprudential
8
8
(EPO)
Jurisprudential →
1
2
3
Statutory
Statutory →
1
1
Jurisprudential →
Statutory
Subtotal
5
3
11
3
22
Total
8
14
22
*For sake of comparison, the policy levers split up in Tables 2 and 3 (first/second medical
use; industrial applicability DNA/general; research on/on-with; compulsory license
dependency/public health; patent term longer/shorter) have been counted as separate policy
levers here. This leads to an increase of the policy levers by five. The net amount of policy
levers uncovered is seventeen instead of twenty-two.
Several of the micro policy levers have a direct impact on the biotechnology
sector. Clear examples are the technical character approach,260 the morality
doctrine,261 the selection invention rule,262 and the testing exemption rule.263
260.
261.
262.
263.

See supra Part 2.1.1.
See supra Part 2.1.2.
See supra Part 2.1.5.
See supra Part 2.1.6.
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However, many micro policy levers produce an indirect effect on the biotechnology
industry. Some policy levers rather affect the biotechnology sector indirectly
because it is a young, advanced, and complex industry branch. An illustrative
example is the use of the expectation of success doctrine.264 This nominally
neutral doctrine does not produce an effect in well-defined technology or industry
sectors. Rather, the doctrine has an effect in “young” industries, such as
biotechnology, where the level of uncertainty is high, compared to “established”
industries where the level of uncertainty is low(er). A similar example is the skilled
person doctrine.265 The rule is not being perceived differently in different industry
sectors. Rather, the level of the skilled person differs between “old” and “new”
fields of research. In “old” conventional technical areas the standard of the PSITA
seems to be lower than the level of the PSITA in “new” technological fields.
Furthermore, the level of PSITA differs between “low” and “advanced”
technologies. In “low” key technologies, the level of the PSITA seems to be
lower, as it can be a single skilled person. In advanced and more complex fields of
research, the level is higher, as the PSITA can be held to be a team of skilled
persons. Since the biotechnological field is both “new” and pretty “advanced,” the
level of the PSITA can differ from other sectors, and the PSITA can, indirectly, be
seen as a judicial micro policy lever in biotechnology. Yet another example of
indirect influence is the breadth of claim doctrine and the related pioneering
patent rule. This doctrine does not produce a specific effect in a particular sector.
Rather, the broad claim doctrine is more likely to be accepted in “new” technology
fields, such as the early days of biotechnology, than in “known” technology fields,
such as the later stages within those areas of biotechnology which have already
been widely explored.266
Quite exceptionally, some policy levers are both a macro and micro policy
lever. The key example here is the industrial applicability rule, which acts as a
macro policy lever in biotechnology, since it clearly sets a higher standard for
human genes by demanding a “function.” The same rule acts as a micro policy
lever in the pharmaceutical sector, since it unintentionally produces a greater effect
in industry sectors characterized by downstream innovation.267
3.1.3. Statutory versus jurisprudential policy levers
According to our limited268 study, about the same amount of statutory and
jurisprudential policy levers has been put into operation in Europe to tailor the
biotechnology sector. The statutory policy levers come into being by an explicit
action from the legislature. On various occasions, the EU legislature has expressly
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See supra Part 2.1.7.
See supra Part 2.1.10.
See supra Part 2.2.3.
See supra Part 2.1.9.
See supra Part 1.2.1.

Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

POLICY LEVERS TAILORING PATENT LAW

11/7/2011 10:16 AM

505

introduced exceptions to patentable subject matter and has modulated
patentability requirements, resulting in a different gate of entry for
biotechnological innovations. The EU legislature believed that achieving optimal
innovation in biotechnology required explicit intervention through statutory
initiatives. This should not come as a surprise, given that Europe is characterized
by a civil law tradition, where formal interventions of government are much more
common practice than in common law jurisdictions.
The jurisprudential policy levers were either explicitly or implicitly implemented
by the EPO Boards of Appeal.269 Illustrative examples of micro policy levers
explicitly deployed in European case law in biotechnology are the expectation of
success rule,270 the PSITA standard,271 the enabling disclosure doctrine,272 and, to
a lesser extent, the selection invention doctrine.273 Key examples of policy levers
implicitly put to work in biotechnology are the clarity of claims and the breadth of
claims doctrine. It remains to be seen to what extent the explicit policy levers
encountered here give evidence of a deliberate and conscious attempt within the
EPO to apply the same rules differently in different sectors. Our research
indicates that the expectation of success rule and the PSITA standard274 did not
vary in biotechnology compared to other industries, but rather differed according
to features such as young/experienced industry, old/new fields of research, and
low/advanced technologies. Furthermore, differentiation is not signaled as a major
issue within the EPO—witness the clear and strong attention for quality, and not
for (the maintenance of) diversity in some recent high level documents from the
EPO.275

269. To decide whether policy levers were put to work explicitly or implicitly, we examined
which of the jurisprudential EPO levers that we uncovered were mentioned under a separate heading
in CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, and
in Part C of the European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the
European Patent Office. We admit this is a pretty “rough” method to discern explicit and implicit use
of policy levers. More refined analytical tools need to be thought of.
270. CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra
note 84, at 132 (Section I. Patentability—D. Inventive Step—6. Expectation of success, especially in
the field of genetic engineering and biotechnology).
271. Id. at 136 (Section I. Patentability—D. Inventive Step—7. Skilled person—7.1.3.
Definition of the skilled person in the art in the field of biotechnology).
272. Id. at 178 (Section II. Conditions to be met by an application—A. Sufficiency of
disclosure—5. The requirement of sufficiency of disclosure in the biotechnology field).
273. See id.
274. See supra Part 3.1.2.
275. See Securing the Stability of the Patent System, in EPO Ann. Rep., at 5–7 (2008) echoing the
view of the President of the EPO, Alison Brimelow (“It is now also clear that the consequences of
the unforeseen success of patents are not all positive, as is evident from frequently critical public
reactions to issues such as the growing mounds of unprocessed applications. Accordingly, the
European Patent Office (EPO) last year intensified its efforts to make the patent system more
effective both in Europe and internationally, with special emphasis on enhancing procedural
efficiency . . . . In the EPO’s view, the second key element in this stabilization process is the ongoing
review and improvement of the European procedure. The EPO is devoting particular attention to
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The use of specific policy levers in EPO case law has far-reaching effects.
First, the deployment of certain levers by the EPO Boards has an influence on the
legislator. Quite often, the jurisprudential levers have given the impetus for the
introduction of statutory levers. Looking at certain policy levers in the field of
biotechnology in Europe shows that some contemporary statutory policy levers
were initially created by the EPO Boards. An illustrative example is the technical
character rule: originated as a judicial policy lever, the technical character rule was
later formally embedded in patent legislation, namely in the EU Biotechnology
Directive, which makes it a statutory policy lever.276 Another key example is the
morality clause: initially embedded in the EPC as a rather pale provision
(Art. 53 (b) EPC), the morality clause was activated at the advent of biotechnology
by the EPO Boards of Appeal, and was later captured by the legislator, who
implemented the clause in a formal patent statute, namely the EU Biotechnology
Directive.277 Yet another example is the second medical use rule: originally shaped
by EPO case law, the rule was later formally enacted in the EPC.278
The application of certain policy levers in EPO case law is also highly
influential, as certain EPO judicial levers may have effects on national courts.
Although EPO verdicts do not have any precedent value on the courts of the
EPC contracting states, which are totally autonomous in their rulings, EPO case
law has a great influence on national judges and ultimately carries great weight in
defining patent practice in European member states. Illustrative in this regard is
the statement of U.K. justice Neuberger in the Kirin-Amgen case: “I am reluctant

further enhancing patent quality, which is also dependent on the quality of the applications that are
filed. Suitable rules governing divisional applications are being discussed, as are appropriate internal
means of permanently raising the bar in terms of the quality of grant proceedings.”). See also Quality
over Quantity: On Course to Raise the Bar, in EPO Ann. Rept., at 8 (2008) (“A final issue in the same
context concerns the influence that can be exerted through the EPO’s fee structure and hence the
best approach to financing the European patent system in order to guarantee its stability in the long
term as well.”). A portfolio of measures set to launch in the spring of 2010 will raise the bar on the
quality of patents while simultaneously improving the efficiency of the granting process. These steps
will better protect inventors who turn to the European Patent Office and, at the same time, see the
EPO grant patents only for innovations having sufficient inventive merit and meeting the needs of
society. This program of measures has been designed with three aims in mind: to secure a clear scope
for the search at the beginning of the procedure and thereby build on solid foundations; to save time
in the application process by reducing the procedural steps through which inventors and the EPO
must pass; and, ultimately, to increase the chances of worthy applicants being granted robust patents.
See also EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Raising the Bar, PATENT INFORMATION NEWS, Feb. 2009, at 4
(stating: “As reported in Patent Information News 2/2009, the ‘Raising the bar’ initiative at the EPO
is not about raising the level of inventive step. Rather, it aims to communicate current best practice
with respect to the assessment of inventive step at the EPO and to ensure a consistent and clear
standard for the assessment of inventive step across all technical fields.”) (emphasis added).
276. See supra Part 2.1.1.
277. See supra Part 2.1.2. As we have explained earlier, policy levers introduced by the
European Union Biotechnology Directive then trickled down to the national statutory level, as well as
the EPC level, through the Implementing Regulations.
278. See supra Part 2.1.4.
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not to follow the approach of the Board, particularly in light of the sheer number
of consistent decisions on this point. However, I am not bound by decisions of
the Board . . . .”279 Given the few patent infringement and nullity cases in the
various EPC member states, the decisions of the EPO Boards are vital to the
efficient operation of the patent system in Europe, and are particularly useful to
the court systems of the smaller countries whose low number of decided cases
provides little help to would-be plaintiffs or defendants.280
Not only may rulings from the EPO Technical Boards of Appeal or from the
Enlarged Board of Appeal produce far reaching effects, decisions from the EPO
Opposition Division can also create significant industry-specific flexibility. Cases
in point are the foundational interpretations of the morality clause by the
Opposition Division to allow patents in the field of human genes (Howard
Florey)281 and transgenic plants (Lubrizol ).282
The reverse influence of national jurisprudential levers on EPO case law is
far less prominent. Even when a court of an EPC contracting state would put into
operation a policy lever in the field of biotechnology, it is quite unlikely that this
lever would be picked up at the European level and be formally embedded in the
EPC or be translated into an EU measure. National courts have no say over the
EPO, let alone the EU, so policy levers applied nationally do not feed back into
the European system automatically. National (civil) courts hardly play a role here
in triggering modifications in the EPC. Much more than creators of policy levers,
national courts in Europe are followers—and to a certain extent also watchdogs—
of the policy levers established by the EPO.283
Jurisprudential differentiation has various advantages, as Burk and Lemley
have repeatedly pointed out.284 Jurisprudential diversification, however, can also
have some downsides. Statutory levers are explicitly articulated and thus create
transparency and (a great level of) legal certainty, whereas jurisprudential levers
may be applied implicitly. Furthermore, jurisprudential levers may change over
time, which may lead to legal uncertainty.
3.1.4. Pre-grant versus post-grant policy levers
Our study shows that in Europe much more pre-grant policy levers have
been put to work, compared to post-grant policy levers (see Table 4. Summary of
the Various European Policy Levers in Biotechnology). Some sixteen pre-grant

279. Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, [2002] R.P.C. 1 (Eng.).
280. William Bird, Using the EPO Opposition Procedure as a Strategy against Patents on Diagnostic
Method, in GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 81, at 73–84.
281. See supra Part 2.1.2. (in particular the holding in the Howard Florey case).
282. See supra Part 2.1.2. (in particular the holding in the Lubrizol case).
283. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 128.
284. See id. at 65. (Burk and Lemley have a clear preference for case-by-case judicial tailoring
by the courts and clearly indicate why.).
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policy levers have been encountered, versus six post-grant policy levers. This
result may be due to the fact that our research did not include national case law,
which might have shed some more light on the application of post-grant policy
levers.
Quite remarkably, the majority of pre-grant levers are jurisprudential in
nature or have started off as case law levers and were later embedded in statutes
(12/16, see Table 4. Summary of the Various European Policy Levers in
Biotechnology). All post-grant levers (4/20), are national statutory levers.
3.1.5. European versus national policy levers
The results on pre-grant versus post-grant levers should not come as a
surprise in light of the current institutional patent architecture. Deciding on the
coming into existence of European patents—and thus on putting into operation
pre-grant policy levers relating to patent acquisition and patent scope—is the
exclusive competence of the EPO, encompassing legislative (EPC) and judicial
branches (EPO Boards). In contrast, deciding on the exercise of patents—and
thus on putting into effect post-grant levers relating to patent rights and
limitations—is the exclusive competence of EPO member states.285
Against this background of division of competences, it was to be expected
that policy levers relating to patent acquisition and patent scope would mainly
originate within the EPO, whereas policy levers on patent rights and limitations
would come about at the national level. More insightful information is to be
expected when research is expanded to national jurisprudence.
3.1.6. Private interest versus public interest levers
Not all policy levers uncovered in the present study may come to the
advantage of the biotechnology industry. Closer analysis of the various policy
levers reveals that rather than expanding the patent system to accommodate
biotechnology inventions and to stimulate innovation in the biotechnology sector,
some policy levers narrow down the patent potential for biotechnological
inventions in Europe. “Tailoring” the patent system to biotech inventions does
not always result in broadening, but can also end up in limiting the patent
incentive.
Policy levers aiming to expand the current patent realm towards
biotechnological inventions definitely include the technical character rule as
applied to DNA (turning DNA from discoveries into inventions), the first and
second medical use doctrine, and the selection invention rule.
Policy levers intended to narrow down the patent gate of entry for
biotechnological inventions can be classified in three distinct categories. A first

285.

See supra Part 2.2.
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series of limiting policy levers is put into operation to foreclose appropriation of
technical knowledge, to increase the public domain, and to facilitate research and
development and follow-on innovation in biotechnology. Clear examples are the
purpose-bound doctrine (limited scope of product claims) and the research “on”plus-“with” exception rule. A second series of minimizing policy levers is put to
work to safeguard public health. An illustrative example is the medical method
doctrine, which was established in a concern to ensure that those who carry out
such methods as part of the medical treatment of humans or the veterinary
treatment of animals are not inhibited by patents.286 Another example is the
compulsory license for public health, which was introduced to seize abusive patent
holders in the area of biotechnology and pharma, in an attempt to ensure fair and
reasonable licensing negotiations, hence, reasonable access to healthcare. A third
series of diminishing levers feeds into the ethical sensitivity surrounding biopatents. The most prominent example in this regard is the use of the morality
clause.
3.2. Comparing European and U.S. Policy Levers
Burk and Lemley describe a dozen policy levers courts already use to
differentiate patent law in different industries.287 Some of these policy levers are
also put into practice in Europe to accommodate biotechnological inventions.
This is the case for the abstract idea-technical character rule,288 the commercial
success doctrine,289 the industrial applicability/utility standard,290 the
PSITA/PHOSITA approach,291 the enabling disclosure requirement,292 the
pioneering patent rule,293 and the research exemption/experimental use
doctrine.294 Other policy levers have not clearly shown up when screening
European patent law for biotechnology shaped rules or doctrines. This is the case
for the reasonable interchangeability doctrine,295 the element-by-element
analysis,296 the reverse doctrine of equivalents,297 and the reasonable royalty
rule.298
Rules that were put into operation as macro policy levers in the U.S. were
not always also employed as macro policy levers in Europe. Two examples are the
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

See supra Part 2.1.3.
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 109.
See id. at 122–24.
See id. at 117–18.
See id. at 110–12.
See id. at 114–17.
See id. at 118–22.
See id. at 127–28.
See id. at 112–14.
See id. at 124–25.
See id. at 125–26.
See id. at 128.
See id. at 128–30.
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enabling disclosure rule, which has been applied differently to biotechnology and
software in both constituencies, and the industrial applicability/utility rule that is
applied more stringently in biotechnology—especially with regard to DNA
inventions—than in other sectors. On the other hand, rules or doctrines that were
deployed as micro policy levers in the U.S. were often put to work in the same
fashion in Europe. By way of example, we refer to the secondary considerations of
nonobviousness, more in particular the commercial success doctrine, which is
being applied nominally across all technology sectors, but which primarily benefits
industries that deal with inventions that translate directly into commercial
products.299
4. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT: “THE PATENT CRISIS” REVISITED
Now that we have arrived at the end of our analysis, we would like to turn to
the beginning of the book which prompted our study. In The Patent Crisis, Burk
and Lemley start from two (empirical) observations: (1) innovation and patent
patterns differ by sector, and (2) the patent system has a unitary architecture.
These observations trigger them to set forth two (normative) questions: (1) what is
the most adequate response to industry-specific innovation and patent patterns,
and (2) who is best positioned to provide such a modular response? The
(normative) vision of Burk and Lemley is that (1) tailoring unitary patent rules is
the best solution to fit the diverse needs of innovators in today’s technology
industries, and (2) courts are best suited to tailor the unitary patent rules through
the use of policy levers. This twofold claim raises some fundamental questions.
4.1. Tailoring
Burk and Lemley claim that the best response to industry specific innovation
and patent patterns is tailoring of the unitary patent rules: “The doctrines we have
discussed . . . all implicate the technology-specific potential of patent law, and they
are all capable of being used to bring patent law in line with optimal patent
policy.”300 Burk and Lemley join the consensus position that the major objective
of the patent system is to promote innovation by granting exclusive rights.301 They
link up with the standard understanding that patent law is a utilitarian mechanism
to encourage investors to invest. According to Burk and Lemley, the best way to
achieve this goal is not to apply the one tool similarly across industries, but to
apply the patent tool differently in different industries.302 Modulating patent law

299. See id. at 110.
300. See id. at 130.
301. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1620
n.147 (2003).
302. Given the idiosyncratic profile of technical and economic determinants for research,
development, and return on investment each distinct technology displays, there is no a priori reason
to believe that a single type of legal incentive will work best for every industry. “Indeed, there is every
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will best serve the goal patent law is set to achieve.
But why is the tailoring of the patent system to diverse needs of industries the
best option? Why is tailoring the unitary patent rules on a case-by-case basis the
best solution? Why should patent law be applied with sensitivity to the
characteristics of different industries? In their book, Burk and Lemley do not
provide well-established normative criteria in responding this question. The
authors do not extensively argue which criteria have been applied to reach this
viewpoint. Only some vague indications of why one solution is more
“attractive” 303 than another are put forward, such as flexibility304 and
favoritism.305
The (implicit) ideology underlying their approach seems to be that adjusting
patent law to different sectors is the best way to serve the economic effect of
patent law. The major (albeit not articulated) normative criterion substantiating
their approach may well be optimal economic effect. Apart from the
(methodological) question of how this effect can be measured, such a viewpoint
calls for further reflection. What about other normative criteria, for example
fairness? Will tailoring patent law to the needs of industry always result in a fair
outcome? Will modulating patent law provide the fairness of a just reward? Might
tailoring not result in either over- or under-rewarding certain innovators or
industries? And what about legal certainty in a regime which is being applied
differently per industry sector, and where changing and wobbling norms are set
forth? Not to mention transparency: What about a system where differing norms
are being applied implicitly and unconsciously? And not-well-articulated standards
float around in administrative patent agencies?
The point is taken that tailoring patent law may well provide more adequate
impulses to innovation. But economic effect on innovation may not be the only
criterion to measure the value of tailoring. Other elements such as fairness of a
just reward, legal certainty, and transparency may spur a more nuanced decision
on what is the best way to accommodate differing patterns of innovation.
Articulating why tailoring is the best solution will help in deciding whether
more or less tailoring is desirable. An important question for Europe is whether
we should retain the current system, and acknowledge and embrace the sectorial
differences established by the legislature and the patent offices, or whether we
should call for a standstill. In Europe, significant tailoring with regard to eligible

reason to believe that achieving optimal innovation in different industries will require greater or lesser
measures of legal incentives.” Burk & Lemley, supra note 301, at 23.
303. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 6.
304. Id. (“A patent system that lacks the flexibility to deal with radical differences between
industries will break rather than bend.”).
305. Id. at 6 (“And a patent system whose flexibility depends on particular industries lobbying
Congress for specialized rules unlikely to produce desirable rules . . . . [T]he lessons of recent efforts
at patent reform are not encouraging for those who would rely on Congress.”).
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subject matter exists. But do we need more? And what for? There is also
significant differentiation with regard to patentability requirements. But do we
want more? The same question applies to modulation with regard to scope of
protection and exercise of rights.
4.2. Courts
Burk and Lemley further claim that courts are best placed to modulate the
patent system and are “best positioned”306 to tailor patent law to the varying needs
of industry. They suggest that, as a general principle, a flexible common law
approach of ongoing judicial oversight will best accommodate new and different
technologies within the general framework of a patent statute.307
Here, Burk and Lemley do explain why legislatures and administrative
agencies are ill placed to address statutory upkeep. The authors are far from
convinced that it is a good idea to leave the tailoring to the legislator: practical
unfeasibility,308 legal uncertainty,309 demarcation problems,310 and lack of general
character311 may be the downsides of legislative interference. A number of
elements caution against the tailoring of the patent system to the needs of
particular industries by administrative agencies too: lack of accountability (of the
staff of the administrative agency)312 and lack of neutrality—consumer
prejudice.313
But it seems that their positive choice for the courts to carry out an industryspecific judicial policy is based on an authoritative and pragmatic—and rather
weak—argument, rather than on a normative one. It is argued that courts can and
should apply the general rules of patent law with sensitivity to the characteristics
of different industries, because the Federal Circuit already does this, consciously
or not. The patent statute and the common law of patents are “chock-full of

306. Id. at 5.
307. Id. at 104.
308. Id. at 97 (“[While] economics can make useful policy suggestions as to how patents work
in different industries, we are skeptical of the ability of a statute to translate those suggestions into
detailed patent rules for each industry.”).
309. Id. (“Rewriting patent law for each industry would involve substantial uncertainty since
fewer interpretative cases would come up involving each statute.”).
310. Id. (“Industry specific legislation would also require a great deal of line drawing, as the
boundaries between industries are vague and notoriously mutable . . . . Drug delivery systems might
be thought of as medical devices, pharmaceuticals or biotechnology . . . presumably a different law
would apply depending on how the invention was characterized.”).
311. Id. (“The history of industry-specific statutes suggests that many fail because they are
drafted with then-current technology in mind and are not sufficiently general to accommodate the
inevitable changes in technology.”).
312. Id. at 106.
313. Id. (“The PTO interacts regularly with those seeking patents, but very little with third
parties affected by the patents they grant. It is little wonder, then, that the PTO in the 1990’s stated its
mission as “to help our customers get patents.”).

Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

POLICY LEVERS TAILORING PATENT LAW

11/7/2011 10:16 AM

513

examples of judicially created, industry specific rules.”314
Furthermore, can the thesis of Burk and Lemley about the pivotal role of the
courts hold out, in light of the European experience? The results of our limited315
study reveal that in European patent law a large part of the policy levers were put
to work by the legislator, and that another significant part was created by the courts
and later codified in statutory law, in other words, legislative reform confirming
judicial discretion. The European experience teaches that the patent system might
also work with a legislature selectively applying industry-specific protection
statutes.
Our study further shows that the most trendsetting case law under European
patent law was set forth by the EPO Technical Boards of Appeal and the EPO
Enlarged Board of Appeal, both organs within an administrative international body.
Are the EPO Boards to be viewed as administrative organs and their verdicts as
administrative decisions? Or are the EPO Boards to be qualified as courts and
their verdicts as true jurisprudential decisions? Recently, the EPO Boards of
Appeal have been recognized as courts or tribunals of an international
organization.316 Even if the question whether EPO Boards can be qualified as
314. Id. at 109.
315. See supra Part 1.2.1.
316.
See Decision of European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case G 0002/06 (Nov. 25,
2008), supra note 78. The appellant argued that, since Rule 28(c) of the European Patent Convention,
supra note 24 (formerly Rule 23 (c)) repeated the wording of Article 6 (2) (c) of the EU Biotechnology
Directive, the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal was interpreting the law of the European Union (EU)
and was required by Article 234 of the remedy, to ask for a ruling by the ECJ, in the present situation
where the interpretation of Article 6 (2) (c) of the Directive is not free of doubt (i.e. not acte clair). The
appellant claimed that the Enlarged Board of Appeal meets the ECJ criteria of being a court or
tribunal, and the ECJ case Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV, 1998 R.P.C. 166 is a precedent
for a court under an international treaty and having jurisdiction for more than a single EU member
state asking for a ruling. The appellant further argued that the vast majority of EPC states are member
states of the EU and the Enlarged Board of Appeal sits in such a state. Not asking the ECJ for a
ruling would bear the risk that national courts would subsequently apply (and be obliged to apply) an
interpretation of Article 6 of the Directive which does not accord with that applied by the EPO. See
id. at 310 (the President of the EPO responded that the Boards of Appeal of the EPO are not courts
or tribunals of a member state of the EU, and there is no power under the EPC for a Board of
Appeal to refer questions to the ECJ); id. at 314 (main points made on behalf of the President of the
European Patent Office in writing and at the oral Proceedings); id. at 318 (Reason 3) (The EPO
Enlarged Board of Appeal finally concluded that neither the EPC nor the Implementing Regulations
thereto make any provision for a referral by any instance of the EPO of questions of law to the ECJ.
The Boards of Appeal are a creation of the EPC, and their powers are limited to those given in the
EPC. Prima facie the conclusion must be that the absence of any provision enabling such a referral
makes such referral impossible.) (emphasis added). Id. at 320 (Reasons 4 and 5):
Nor does Article 234 of the EC Treaty giving the ECJ jurisdiction to give
preliminary rulings concerning inter alia the validity and interpretation of acts of
the institutions of the European Community, such as the Directive, appear to
provide any basis for a Board of Appeal of the EPO to request the ECJ to give
a ruling on any questions before such Board of Appeal. Article 234 of the EC
Treaty requires the question to be raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of an EU member state. Whereas EPO Boards of Appeal have been
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courts might be answered in the affirmative, do they fit the civil court concept
Burk and Lemley have in mind? What is so specific, so unique about a civil court
that they, and they only, can best perform the task of tailoring, rather than the
judicial organs within the patent administration? Is it the legal environment? Civil
courts operate within a wide set of well recognized procedural and substantive
laws, whereas the EPO is an international organization operating in an
“incomplete legal environment.”317 Is it the training and background of the
judges? Civil courts are staffed with legally trained judges, whereas the EPO
courts 318 are mainly equipped with scientists. Is it their autonomy? Civil courts are
staffed with independent judges, whereas the EPO Boards are crewed with
bureaucrats, who in spite of the fact that they are guaranteed independence and
non-intervention from the executive powers as to their judicial
functions (Art. 23 EPC) may be found to fall short of the standards set up
internationally for courts of law.319 Is it accountability? In the U.S., direct recourse
from the USPTO Board of Appeals is possible to civil courts, namely the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), whereas no direct recourse with a civil
court, nor with the CJEU,320 is possible against the decisions from the EPO
Boards.
Spelling out what are the necessary features of “a court” is needed. Defining

recognized as being courts or tribunals, they are not courts or tribunals of an
EU member state but of an international organization whose contracting states
are not all members of the EU . . . . The Administrative Council of the EPO as
legislator responsible for the Implementing Regulations found it necessary to
introduce what are now Rules 26 to 29 (formerly 23b to 23e [of the European
Patent Convention, supra note 24] so that the provisions of the EPC
correspond to those of the Directive. Thereby all Contracting States to the
EPC, even those not members of the EU, have indicated their will that these
rules be used to interpret the EPC when considering whether or not a
European patent should be granted. But this cannot be taken as conferring
some new power or imposing some new obligation on the Boards of Appeal to
ask for an interpretation by the ECJ of the EPC or its Implementing
Regulations. Certainly the Contracting States to the EPC which are not
member states of the EU cannot be presumed to have conferred jurisdiction
on the ECJ.
317.
CATARINA HOLTZ, DUE PROCESS FOR EUROPEAN PATENTING: A COMPARATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE STUDY 3 (2007). See also FELICE MORGENSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 3 (1986).
318.
We will not go into the issue again here, whether the EPO Boards of Appeal can be
considered to be “courts.” See infra Part 1.2.1.
319.
See Consultative Council of Eur. Judges, Report of the 2nd meeting—Strasbourg, 21–23
November
2001
(2002),
available
at
https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1047753
&Site=DGHL&BackColorInternet=B9BDEE&BackColorIntranet=FFCD4F&BackColorLogged=F
FC679 (on the independence, efficiency and role of the judges, which lays down a minimum
standards for national courts of law).
320.
No appeal lies open from the EPO to the European Court of Justice, contrary to the
current regime for Community Plant Variety Rights and Community Trademarks. See also supra Part
1.2.1.
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which of the characteristics set forth here are relevant to be nominated as the best
and most suitable actor, and examining to what extent the EPO Boards fit into
this best actor definition, is most desirable. This will help in deciding who is best
positioned to tailor industry’s diverse needs in the future in Europe—the
legislator, the EPO Boards, or the national courts. A choice for the one or the
other can only be made by weighing the various options against a set of wellarticulated and elaborated normative criteria.
5. FINAL REMARKS
5.1. Future Research
First and foremost, a further critical examination of the basic normative
assumptions underlying the Burk and Lemley vision, and of alternative normative
outlooks, is urgently needed. On top of such reflection and analysis, more
descriptive-analytical research needs to be done as well. The present study was our
very first attempt to portray in a systematic manner the way in which policy levers
have been put into operation in European patent law to accommodate
bioinventions. Although the results are very insightful already, the list of policy
levers presented here is not complete by far. Additional rules and standards or
doctrines which have been created to accommodate biotechnological inventions
can likely be uncovered. Further research is needed to bring additional policy
levers, relevant in biotechnology, to the fore.
The present study examined three different bodies of patent legislation: the
EPC and its Implementing Regulations, the EU Biotechnology Directive, and a
selection of national patent acts, more in particular the patent acts of Belgium, the
Netherlands, and France. Future research should give more attention to the
specific guidelines in the sector of biotechnology introduced by patent offices.
Particularly, the EPO Examination Guidelines, as well national guidelines, should
be examined more systematically to see whether additional levers can be
discerned.
For the present study, only one of the three levels of patent case law was
explored in depth: the EPO case law of the Technical Boards of Appeal, including
decisions from the Technical Boards of Appeal and the Enlarged Boards of
Appeal. To obtain a more complete picture of the current use of policy levers in
case law, further research needs to be carried out to explore even more EPO case
law. In addition, the current overview needs to be complemented with
jurisprudential decisions from national courts. Even though the analysis of EPO
case law may be quite indicative for the current use of policy levers in
biotechnology, further research is needed to provide a more complete sketch.
Analyzing biotechnology-related case law of the courts in the thirty-eight EPC
contracting states seems like a daunting task, but one that might be extremely
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informative on the workings of European patent law in practice.321 Last but not
least, long-awaited case law of the CJEU needs to be followed up.322
The present study focused on policy levers in the biotechnology sector.
Studying policy levers in another industry sector such as software would
contribute to the analysis, as it would provide a kind of benchmark, and deepen
our understanding of the levers in biotechnology.
Our study analyzed policy levers independently from one another. However,
the optimal setting for any given policy lever may depend in part on how other
levers are deployed.323 There is an extensive economics literature on the
interaction among intellectual property policy levers. Further research is also
needed to examine the interaction among different policy levers in biotechnology.
And this brings us to our last point. The results of the present study call for
further study in light of economic theories and findings on the various modes of
innovation, and on the interrelationship between innovation theories and patent
theories. There is a vast body of literature on this issue that has not been taken
into account yet in the present study.324 It will be most interesting to look into
empirical economic evidence on the effects of the differing use of policy levers
across industries.325
321. Such a quest may well be initiated by analyzing the cases discussed in European Patent
Office, European National Patent Decisions Report, 2004. Even though the selection of cases is very
limited, it may represent a good starting point, having to be supplemented with a state-of-the-art
search for national case law.
322. See Case C-34/10, Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., Oct. 18, 2011, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6 (a request from the German Bundesgerichtshof (the Federal
Court of Justice) of Dec. 17, 2009 concerning the ability of an inventor to patent methods and
products involving the use of human embryonic stem cells (Article 6 of the EU Biotechnology
Directive)); see also Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, July 6, 2010, 2010 E.C.R. 7,
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (a request from the Dutch court of ‘s Gravenhage
of Sept. 24, 2008 concerning the scope of patent claims for transgenic plants (Articles 8 and 9 of the
EU Biotechnology Directive)).
323. What has been examined most so far is the interaction of length and breadth. See, e.g.,
Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106, 106–12
(1990); Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113, 12024 (1990); Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Length and Breadth with Costly Imitation, 24 RAND J. ECON. 52, 60
(1992). See Paula Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111
YALE L.J. 1575, 1585 (2002).
324. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 79–92 and the references cited there. See also Burk
& Lemley, supra note 301, and the references cited there; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent
Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155–206 (2002) and the references cited there;
DOMINIQUE GUELLEC & BRUNO VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, THE ECONOMICS OF
THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM IP POLICY FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 250 (1st ed.
2007) and the many valuable references cited there.
325. An example of such research, providing more than just some more anecdotal evidence, is
to be found in Hazel V.J. Moir, How High is the Inventive Step? Some Empirical Evidence, Address at the
4th Annual Conference of the EPIP Association (Sept. 24–25, 2009), available at
http://www.epip.eu/conferences/epip04/files/MOIR_Hazel.pdf. See also Kristina B. Dahlin & Dean
M. Behrens, When is Invention Really Radical? Defining and Measuring Technological Radicalness, 34(5) RES.
POL. 717, 717–37 (2005).
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5.2. Concluding Thoughts
A big value of the book The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It of
Burk and Lemley is that it demystifies the image of a unitary patent system. The
authors collected wide evidence that the current, nominally technology-neutral
patent system in fact has different effects in different industries. Further, they
demonstrated that the courts can play a pivotal role in further tailoring the patent
system to the differences in varying technological sectors. The courts do apply the
nominally unitary patent system with sensitivity to the needs and features of
different industries.
Turning the spotlights to Europe, our analysis shows that the alleged unitary
European patent system, in particular the EPC, is not always applied in the same
way in different circumstances either. Furthermore, not the civil courts, but the
EPO is responsible for tailoring the patent system to the diversities in differing
technological sectors by way of administrative case law. This internal case law,
although having no precedence over national court decisions, has a wide-ranging
effect, and at various occasions has been integrated in European patent legislation.
European patent law holds substantial potential for technology-specific
application. Even though the European Convention (EPC) may have been
conceived at its inception as a nominally neutral patent statute, our study clearly
reveals that substantial discretion to differ the patent system by industry, and in
particular to tailor it to the specificities of the biotechnology sector, was built into
the system over the years. Although the EPC was introduced as a unitary
regulatory tool intended to operate the same way across technologies, EPO case
law has shown increased interest and ability in tailoring patent law to the needs of
distinct technology sectors, and in particular the biotechnology sector.
Not all policy levers uncovered come to the advantage of the biotechnology
industry, though. Closer analysis of the various policy levers reveals that rather
than expanding the patent system to accommodate biotechnology inventions and
stimulating innovation in the biotechnology sector, some policy levers narrow
down the patent potential for biotechnological inventions in Europe in an attempt
to reflect concerns of public health and ethical conscience.

